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SYMPOSIUM
RELIGIOUS VALUES AND CORPORATE DECISION
MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INTERFAITH
CONFERENCE FOR CORPORATE EXECUTIVES AND
LEGAL COUNSEL'
WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION
MS. UELMEN: 2 At this point we will get started. I am Amy
Uelmen, the Director of Fordham Law School's Institute on Religion,
Law and Lawyer's Work. Welcome. I will be your emcee for the day.
Just a few words to get us started and to express our hopes for
today's program. As we were putting together today's program, at a
certain point I envisioned our agenda as something of a response to the
recent corporate scandals and the search for resources to retrieve a sense
of orientation and professional integrity. Talking this over with Joe
Geoghan,3 he mused, and this is not an exact quote, "I think the issues
here stand on their own. They are bigger and much more important than
that." I think with that he really captured the heart of our work today
and the Institute's work as a whole.
True, for many, religious values can serve as an important source of
orientation in the midst of a crisis. But the deeper challenge is more
1. The symposium was hosted at Fordham University School of Law on February
23, 2004. It has been edited to remove minor cadences of speech that appear awkward
in writing and to identify significant sources when referred to by the speakers.
2. Amy Uelmen is the Director of the Fordham University School of Law Institute
on Religion, Law and Lawyer's Work. Recently Professor Uelmen was named the
recipient of the Charles Carroll Award by the Guild of Catholic Lawyers of the
Archdiocese of New York. Under Uelmen's direction, and in conjunction with founder
Professor Russell G. Pearce, the Institute on Religion, Law, and Lawyer's Work has
gained a national profile and become a standard for other law schools that are seeking to
promote dialogue on religious values and the practice of law.
3. Joseph E. Geoghan, Esq., is Retired Vice-President and General Counsel, and
Member of the Board of Directors, of Union Carbide Corporation.
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constructive and more positive, and perhaps in many ways more
ordinary. This challenge is to articulate what religious values capture
and express at the heart of human experience, and then how this can
inform all aspects of life, including the law, including business life.
Today's program is also designed to acknowledge and take very
seriously the important questions which arise in the course of this
endeavor. For example, in our increasingly complex and pluralistic
business environments, might drawing on religious beliefs generate
otherwise avoidable conflicts and misunderstandings?
My deepest hope is that today might be both an opportunity to
openly discuss the obstacles we see, and also to discover in the context
of inter-disciplinary and inter-faith conversation a vast terrain of
common ground.
So thank you to all of you who have worked hard to enrich the
panels and spread the word, and also to Fordham's Center for Corporate
Securities and Financial Law, which is co-sponsoring the program, the
Economics Department and the Business School, and to the enthusiastic
help from our students on the Journal of Corporate and Financial Law.
I would also like to thank Dean William Michael Treanor4 for his
unflagging support for this ongoing conversation. And now he would
like to say a few words of welcome as well.
DEAN TREANOR: Thanks very much, Amy.
On behalf of Fordham Law School, I am very pleased to welcome
all of you to this conference, which I am sure will be a fabulous day of
discussion. Thanks to all who have worked so hard to put it together,
and special thanks to our two speakers who traveled from Italy
especially for this occasion and who bring to our conversation the
breadth and depth of international perspectives.
I am especially proud that this conference is part of the University's
Sapientia et Doctrina (Wisdom and Learning) Lecture Series, which, in
the founding spirit and continuing mission of Fordham, is designed to
emphasize rigorous scholarship, lively intellectual exchange, and values-
based education. What better model for our students than to see
lawyers, economists, and business experts all engaged in a serious
conversation that takes to heart the important question of how religious
4. William Michael Treanor is the Dean of the Fordham University School of
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values might intersect with corporate decision making.
And finally, I would like to acknowledge the terrific work of
Russell Pearce5 of our faculty, who is the Director of the Institute on
Law, Religion, and Lawyer's Work, and Amy Uelmen, who is the
Director for the program, who have done not just enormous work in
putting together this program but have really changed, I think, American
legal education by bringing these questions, the questions of the
intersection of religious values and lawyering, onto the table, bringing
them into the discussion. It is really fabulous and important work and I
want to acknowledge them both for the fabulous work for the program
and their great work in putting together this day's discussions.
So welcome all. Thank you so very much for coming. At this point
I would like to turn matters over to Professor Pearce.
5. Russell G. Pearce has taught at Fordham University School of Law since 1990.
He is a co-Director of the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics. Professor Pearce
teaches Professional Responsibility, Ethics in Public Interest Law and the Housing
Rights Clinic.
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PANEL ONE: DOES CORPORATE DECISION
MAKING ALLOW ROOM FOR RELIGIOUS VALUES?
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Russell G. Pearce
Professor, Fordham University School of Law
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Steven H. Resnicoff
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W. Bradley Wendel
Professor, Washington & Lee University School of Law
PROF. PEARCE: Thank you, Dean Treanor.
I will just briefly add my welcome as well, and my thanks to my
colleague Amy Uelmen, who really has done an amazing job in putting
together this program, which I believe is the first of many where we will
be exploring the questions that we are going to start with today on
religious values and corporate decision-making.
For our first panel, "Does Corporate Decision-Making Allow Room
for Religious Values?," which is in many ways going to set the tone and
lay the table for conversations that will continue throughout the day, we
are privileged to have three really excellent speakers: Mark Sargent, the
Dean of Villanova University School of Law; Brad Wendel, Professor at
Washington & Lee School of Law; and Steve Resnicoff, Professor at
DePaul College of Law.
The way we are going to proceed - we have about fifty minutes
allotted for this panel - is we have asked each of the panelists to speak
for no more than ten minutes. In that way, we hope to open up the last
547
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twenty minutes for interaction with you and interaction among the
panelists themselves.
We would like to start with Dean Sargent.
DEAN SARGENT: With ten minutes, this is going to be kind of
breathless.
The focus of this conversation is going to be: should religinus
values play a role in corporate decision-making or in the way individuals
within corporations make their decisions? But it also asks: is there a
place, as a practical, empirical matter, for religious values in corporate
decision-making?
I am on the side of the argument which maintains that there should
be a place for people to incorporate their religious values into the way
they make decisions in corporations. But I would argue that as an
empirical matter, there is very little room for religious values in the way
corporate managers or corporate lawyers make their decisions.
I have approached this question through some work I have been
doing on the moral complicity of corporate lawyers in the corporate
scandals of the last few years. I am trying to figure out why is it that
lawyers demonstrated so many different kinds of complicity in activity
that was both illegal and immoral?
This led me to a focus on the moral origins of corporate
wrongdoing itself; that is, the wrongdoing by the managers who are the
clients of lawyers. In studying the behavior of both the lawyers and
their managerial clients in the recent scandals, I found that there is
something that links them all: an apparent indifference to the morality of
their actions.
Most of the lawyers involved presumably possessed some form of
personal moral code, whether based on religious or secular premises, as
well as a professional moral code that should have been as stringent in
its proper sphere as any personal morality.
At a minimum, these personal and professional moral codes,
whether religious or not, would have insisted upon truth-telling,
integrity, concern about the consequences of one's actions for others,
recognition of the limitations on one's obligations to a client, and an
understanding that the legal is not coextensive with the moral. These
moral priorities, however, often seemed to disappear into a smog of
expediency, rationalization, willful blindness, and slavish obedience to
the wishes of self-interested managers who purported to speak for the
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corporate client.
Of course, we cannot read the hearts of these lawyers, and our
knowledge of the facts is incomplete, and hindsight judgment of others
can be self-indulgent, but the facts speak for themselves. Many lawyers
in these cases, whether actively or passively, helped corporate managers
act illegally, immorally, or both.
Well, why? Perhaps something useful can be found by looking at
the social situations in which these lawyers lived and acted. What was it
about their roots in specific social contexts that influenced the way they
thought about what is permissible and what is not, and which seems to
have caused them to sideline or bracket the sense of limits they brought
with them to the workplace from their personal religious or professional
moral formations?
Extraordinary insight into this question can be found in a book by
the sociologist Robert Jackall, published in 1988, called Moral Mazes:
The World of Corporate Managers.' This book is an in-depth
sociological analysis based on extensive field work among corporate
managers in several corporations in the chemical and textile industries in
the early 1980s.2
Jackall's goal was to examine how corporate bureaucracy shapes
moral consciousness.3 His premise was that the moral consciousness of
corporate managers has to be understood not in terms of abstract
philosophical, religious, or professional moral systems, but
sociologically, that is as an empirical objective reality to be
investigated.4 In Moral Mazes, Jackall identifies the actual moral rules
in use that governed the way his corporate managers behaved in their
social setting.5 This highly concrete, empirical approach enabled Jackall
to avoid the abstractness of most discussions of business or professional
ethics and to explain why managers bracket the moralities, particularly
1. ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS,
(Oxford Univ. Press 1988).
2. Mark A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Moral Maze, 49 VILL. L. REv. 867, 872
(2004) (applying Jackall's analytical framework to the large law firm).
3. See JACKALL, supra note 1, at 3 (stating purpose of author's study).
4. Id. at 4.
5. Id.
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the religious moralities, that they might hold outside the workplace or
that they might adhere to privately, and to follow instead the prevailing
morality of their particular organizational situation.
He argues, in essence, that managers tend to adhere to an
occupational morality determined by the social structure of their
workplace.6 If one wants to understand why managers and lawyers
choose to act one way and not the other, including acting morally and
illegally, one needs to understand that occupational morality, and to
understand that occupational morality one must understand the social
context in which it emerges.
In the large business corporation, Jackall argues, the social context
is bureaucratic. 7 That word is important. Bureaucratic work shapes
people's consciousness in decisive ways. Many of those ways are
familiar. When we hear the word "bureaucratic," for example, we think
of its rational and hierarchical characteristics.
But other ways are less familiar. We tend not to think of apparently
impersonal bureaucracies as crucibles of intense personal competition,
in which people are subjected to subtle measures of prestige and an
elaborate status hierarchy. This scenario fosters an intense competition
for status, and makes the rules, procedures, social context, and protocol
of an organization into paramount psychological and behavioral guides
that become far more important than religious or other personal
moralities. It is in the context of deeply personal competition for status
in a hierarchical system of power and domination that people learn to be
guided by the rules that will promote their success.
A foundational rule within managerial circles is the imperative to
bracket conventional morality, including religious morality, because
such norms are widely recognized to be inapplicable except as public
relations stances.8 Once those norms are bracketed, the organization's
rules in use determine the decisions that individual managers make.
I cannot do justice in these brief comments to Jackall's thick
description of the world of his corporate managers or the intricacies of
its moral system, but some of its key characteristics can be summarized:
* Their world is characterized by intense competition for status and
6. Id. at 6; see also Sargent, supra note 2, at 873.
7. Sargent, supra note 2, at 873.
8. JACKALL, supra note 1, at 6.
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power, with people continually pitted against each other.9
e A disconnection between hard work and success based on the
reality that hard work alone cannot produce success; the ability to play
the corporate game is crucial. 10
* A disconnection between appearance and reality derived from the
realization that the important decisions are made in back rooms, that the
public reasons for decisions are often not the real reasons, and that a
willingness to sustain that disconnection is crucial to personal
advancement. 1
* An almost feudal system of personal loyalty and fealty between
supervisors and inferiors in which personal fates are interconnected and
group loyalties are of paramount importance. 12
9 An enormous premium on flexibility and willingness to adapt to
expediency rapidly. 3
* An optimistic belief that problems of questionable legality or
morality can be outrun before the consequences come to roost and,
9. Sargent, supra note 2, at 874; see JACKALL, supra note 1, at 36 (describing the
situation as one where "rewards are always scarce, bureaucracies... pit people against
each other and inevitably thwart the ambitions of some."). Jackall sees the competitive
dynamic as both a competition for resources and also as a type of psychological
competition: "Even more important on a day-to-day basis is the ongoing competition
between talented and aggressive people to see whose will prevails, who can get things
done their way." Id. Jackall notes that the two types of competition are
complementary, insofar as the ability to impose one's will creates a credibility that
facilitates competition for resources. See id. (describing relationship between two types
of competition).
10. "Managers see success depending principally on meeting social criteria
established by the authority and political alignments - that is, by the fealty and alliance
structure - and by the ethos and style of the corporation." JACKALL, supra note 1, at
45.
11. See id. at 88 (explaining why discrepancies exist with respect to reasons given
for making decisions). See also Sargent, supra note 2, at n.23.
12. See JACKALL, supra note 1, at 25 (discussing sharing of credit for success
within hierarchical subgroups in corporations). Jackall emphasizes the importance of
group loyalty by comparing managerial circles, in sociological terms, to gangs. See id.
at 39 (discussing social contexts which breed alliances).
13. See id. at 128-33 (discussing importance of flexibility and adaptability to
expedience in order to maintain solidarity with managerial colleagues).
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hence, need not be confronted.'
4
* A pervasive sense of social uncertainty in which one is constantly
aware of being evaluated, but in a system that is capricious and in which
all status arrangements are contingent and fluid.15
In such a world, a distinctive set of moral rules in use emerge, one
adapted to the social intricacies of the organization, and those rules can
be characterized as follows:
* The prevailing ethos is remarkable for its lack of fixedness.
Decisions are governed by essential, pervasive, and thoroughgoing
pragmatism in which alertness to expediency is of paramount
importance. 16
o Questions of right or wrong should not be confronted as such. An
insistence on the moral dimensions of an issue is regarded as, at best,
embarrassing, and, at worst, fatally disloyal. 7
e A willingness to keep silent about problems that may prove
embarrassing to superiors or the organization is highly prized. 8
e Fealty to superiors within the organization trumps other moral
obligations.' 9
* Individual responsibility for problems or mistakes should be
avoided. Responsibility should be diffused as much as possible.2 °
14. See id. at 96-100 (describing attitude exemplified by game of "milking the
plant" to generate short-term profits that elicit a positive image for the plant managers,
and long-term losses that are not realized until after managers leave, whose blame may
be cast upon their successors).
15. Id. at 33 ("Because of the interlocking ties between people, they know that a
shake-up at or near the top of a hierarchy can trigger a widespread upheaval, bringing in
its wake startling reversals of fortune, good and bad, throughout the structure.").
16. Id. at 105 ("[A] principal managerial virtue and, in fact, managers' most
striking actual characteristic is an essential, pervasive, and thoroughgoing
pragmatism").
17. See id. at 101-05 (discussing how "White," a specialized manager hired by a
textile company to deal with the problem of damage to employees' hearing resulting
from long-term exposure to the company's machinery, failed in his efforts to focus
managers' attention to the problem, precisely because of his insistence on framing the
problem as a moral one).
18. See id. at 31 (regarding secrecy as a pervasive corporate phenomenon).
19. See id. at 109 (discussing how a manager, who was troubled by blatant illegal
manipulation of a pension fund by his supervisors, was fired because he "could not just
go along with things even if he did not agree").
20. See id. at 85-90 (describing various aspects of corporate scapegoating, use of
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9 Legal and regulatory requirements should be regarded cynically,
and compliance should be conducted in a manner that serves the
interests of the individual manager. l
* Truth-telling is essentially optional because "'truth' is socially
defined, not absolute, [so] ... that... compromise, about anything and
everything, is not moral defeat... , but simply an inevitable fact of
organizational life. 22
It should be no surprise that Jackall identified several instances in
which these rules in use prevented his corporate managers from coping
honestly with instances of even blatant illegality, such as financial fraud
perpetrated by the CEO.
Much of what Jackall describes, which took place in the 1980s, is
eerily prophetic of the widespread financial fraud at the highest levels of
major corporations that surfaced so dramatically in recent years. While
Jackall's conclusions about corporate America are, almost by definition,
limited by his ethnological methodology to a particular set of companies
in two specific and highly troubled industries during one time period, the
scale and breadth of the recent corporate scandals suggest that the
dynamic he describes, or something like it, was widespread in corporate
America in the years since Moral Mazes was published in 1988. The
highly particularized, socially conditioned moral world he analyzes so
minutely may indeed be a large part of our world.
So, that is the context in which one should discuss the question of
whether religious values should play a role in corporate decision-
making.
PROF. PEARCE: Thank you very much.
PROF. WENDEL: We were talking before the panel began, and
Russ was joking about the allocation of labor among all of us as "values
yes," "values no," and "values maybe." I think I have been designated
"values no."
I want to make sure that joke is not misunderstood, because what I
blame, and diffusion of responsibility by big corporations when things go wrong).
21. See id. at 147-48, 155-61 (summarizing managers' attitudes toward regulation
and regulators, and of managers' need to overcome their challenges).
22. See id. (analyzing ideological mind sets that impede managers' capacity to deal
with regulatory requirements in chemical and textile industries).
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am arguing for is the most sympathetic case that I can come up with for
the kind of resistance that we may expect from the standpoint of liberal
political theory. What I want to do is clear up some misunderstandings
about the kind of preclusion or filtering or screening that is imposed by
liberal political theory and bracket some concerns. Let's figure out what
exactly this theory has to say to the religious lawyering or corporate
decision-making movement, and whether it really is a threat or not to
this project.
I come at this from the point of view of someone who studies the
legal profession, and so for me the law has a distinctive role to play in
decision-making. When the law is invoked, you have the state acting
coercively to restrict the autonomy of citizens.
The central question for liberal political theory is: When is the state
justified in doing this? When is the state justified in saying to someone,
"You must not do this" or "you must do this"? What possible basis can
it have for doing so other than the happenstance that it has power?
And so the standard question that is often raised about state
authority is: How is this justified? What is the reason why the state can
exercise coercive power over its citizens?
The kind of standard answer to this, given by John Rawls and
others, is that to the extent that the state functions coercively, its actions
must be based on reasons that the affected citizen could, in principle,
endorse if that citizen were fully informed and rational on the matter.23
Now, in a pluralistic society, there is a challenge created by the
diversity of value systems or comprehensive doctrines that citizens may
have. People disagree - that is an observed fact - about pluralism,
and people do not always share reasons. And so as a consequence, the
justification for state authority is generally not given in terms of
something thick and comprehensive, but rather on the basis of
something fairly thin which is something that can be shared among all
citizens no matter what comprehensive view they subscribe to.24
23. JOHN RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999); see also Russell Korobkin,
Symposium: Determining Health Care Rights From Behind a Veil of Ignorance, 1998
U. ILL. L. REv. 801 (discussing the Rawlsian theory that individuals operate behind a
veil of ignorance).
24. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (2005) (discussing "reasonable
pluralism" as the existence of a variety of comprehensive religious and philosophical
conceptions of the good).
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The result of this thinning out of values is the screening or
preclusion that Dean Sargent was alluding to. Most pejoratively, Sandy
Levinson has a piece on Jewish lawyering where he talks about
"bleaching out contingent characteristics of our personalities," and that
is one pejorative way to describe this.25
But the liberal preclusion requires people, to the extent they act
coercively, to screen out certain aspects of their belief systems because
they are not widely shared. Now, it is important to be clear on what
exactly this means and what the consequence is for religious decision-
making.
One of the more moderate stances toward this, by a political
philosopher named Robert Audi, requires not that religious people
bleach out anything about themselves that is not widely shared, but
rather that they act in such a way that they could, in principle, advance a
shared reason, even though that may not in fact be their motivation.26
Audi requires only that people, in principle, potentially have
"justificatorily adequate and motivationally adequate reason," in the
sense that there is some reason that could explain and justify one's
actions, even in the absence of theological considerations.27
It is also important to recognize that this kind of constraint, this
kind of screening, would apply to a wide variety of secular doctrines as
well as religious doctrines. This is not a point of view that is motivated
by some stigma imposed on religious beliefs. No one is suggesting that
religious beliefs are uniquely irrational or dangerous. The problem is
only that they are not widely shared. And the same is true of a number
of secular value systems as well.
The concern here is coercion based on the happenstance that some
group has power and some other group does not have power. There is
no fear of religion; it is a fear of not-widely-shared values.
A further clarification that is important to make is that it is often
assumed that liberal political theory is based on value relativism or a
25. Sandy Levinson, Note, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the
Construction of Professional Identity, 14 CARDOZo L. REV. 1577, 1578 (1993).
26. ROBERT AUDI, THE ARCHITECTURE OF REASON 135-70 (Oxford Univ. Press
2001).
27. Id.
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lack of belief in objective values. But I think a different way to put it
might be that even if there are objective values, they may not always be
accessible to our discernment.
My own faith tradition emphasizes the realization that all humans
are fallen and sinful and this affects our ability to discern and act on true
moral beliefs. In Lutheran doctrine, the soul is never fully transformed
and we remain sinful even as we are justified before God.28 And so as a
consequence, we should be humble in our attempt to discern and act on
true moral values, although we do believe there are objective moral
truths.
So it is not necessarily the case that value relativism is in the
driver's seat when liberal political theory tries to screen out values. It is
not a disbelief in values necessarily; it is simply a certain amount of
humility about claims of objective moral truth.
It is important also to realize that this liberal screen or filter applies
only when coercive action is implicated. For me that is a fairly wide
field, because I study the law and the legal profession, but Rawls and
Audi and Greenawalt and others who write about religion in the public
domain do not attempt to screen out religious values in non-coercive
settings. They permit people to exhort, attempt to persuade, advance
reasons that others may find persuasive, and use religious values as a
backstop for motivation.
So Dean Sargent was talking about why it is that lawyers fall into
this pervasive culture of bureaucratic complicity. Religious values can
serve as an additional source of motivation for religious corporate
managers or lawyers, even though they may not be necessarily advanced
as the sole reason in public discourse for an action.
So the screen here is not such a broad screen that it requires what
Levinson fears, a bleaching-out of contingent aspects of one's self.29
Nothing has to be bleached out. But insofar as one acts coercively, there
must be a non-religious shared reason available to justify one's actions.
Now, even this, what I think is a fairly modest filter, is too strong
for many believers. From the standpoint of a religious believer, the
question is not what justification does the state have for acting; the
28. EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH OF AMERICA, THE JOINT DECLARATION ON
THE DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION, http://www.elca.org/ecumenical/ecumenicaldialogue/
romancatholic/jddj/declaration.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
29. Levinson, supra note 25.
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question is: What justification do I have for playing anything else above
my duty to obey God? What possible reason could I have for deferring
to something that is merely a human construct?
Christianity is a radical and subversive religion, and a believer
might justifiably ask: Why on earth should I give that up? What justifies
me in deferring to this interest the state has in functioning non-
coercively?
One thing that emerges from looking at the religious lawyering
literature is that one's attitude toward the law and other institutions of
the secular state depends to a great extent on one's sense that the world
is either irredeemably evil or not and one's feeling of alienation from the
world. What I find interesting is that the extent of one's alienation from
the world can itself be a theological question and can itself be something
on which faith traditions disagree both among themselves and internally.
There is a well-known book, called Christ and Culture, by Richard
Niebuhr, which talks about a variety of stances that Christians can take
toward the world. Christian doctrines vary quite a bit between them and
also among themselves.30 I was looking at a number of papers on
Catholic social thought, which is not something I am an expert on, but
there is quite a lot of internal disagreement within Catholic social
thought about the stance that a believer ought to take toward the state.3 '
So this suggests two possible responses to the problem of one's
own duty to obey God and this secular preclusion principle that we have
been talking about. There may be some specific response within a faith
tradition for handling this tension. And again, within the Lutheran
tradition, which is the one with which I am familiar, there are specific
doctrines, such as the concept of a calling or vocation and this two
kingdoms idea, which is often misunderstood and often used by
Lutherans as a reason to not challenge injustice, but nevertheless,
understood properly, this might provide a resource within a faith for
30. RICHARD NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE 22 (Harper 1951).
31. See Thomas T. Love, The Two Principles of Roman Catholic Church-State
Relations, ETHICS, Vol. 76 No. 1, at 57-61 (Oct. 1965) (discussing opposing views
among Catholics on harmony between and obedience to church law and to civil law);
see also HEINRICH A. ROMMENN, THE STATE IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT: A TREATISE IN
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (St. Louis B. Herder Book Co. 1945).
558 FORDHAMJOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. XI
FINANCIAL LA W
accommodating oneself to the duty to support institutions of the state
while also obeying God.
But to the extent that there is widespread disagreement either within
a faith tradition or among faith traditions, or between religious people
and secular people, there is still an argument for the authority of the
state. I only have about a minute, so I will do my one-minute, nutshell
version of this.
To the extent that we recognize the need for cooperative action in
the face of disagreement, we perceive a reason to support institutions
that facilitate this kind of coordinated action, even though they may not
be based on something that we take to be a substantive, objective moral
truth. There might be only a procedural reason, a very thin reason, for
supporting a legal institution, but that thin reason is one that we all
share, even from within a faith tradition, and that reason is the desire to
engage in coordinated action with people with whom we disagree.
I take it that a corporation is a paradigmatic example of an
institution composed of people who perceive the need for coordinated
action in the face of disagreement, coordinated action within the
corporation and also with the rest of the world, with banks and
customers and shareholders and people from a wide variety of
substantive value orientations.
Because the law facilitates coordinated action, notwithstanding
deep and persistent disagreement, it has authority for all people on the
basis of this shared reason. Again, this does not preclude people from
bearing witness, serving as prophets, challenging the law, trying to
persuade, appealing to religious values, in non-coercive settings. This is
not a complete bleaching-out, but it nevertheless does require at least a
limited extent of cooperation and obedience to secular institutions
despite one's religious motivation.
Thanks.
PROF. PEARCE: Thank you. I really want to, as the self-interested
moderator, thank the speakers for being so respectful of our time
constraints.
PROF. RESNICOFF: Good morning.
Dean Sargent asked, first, whether there should be a way for people
to incorporate their religious values into their decision-making? Second,
he asked whether, in fact, there is such a way. I had some other remarks
prepared, but I would like to address those two questions briefly.
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First, should there be a place for people to incorporate their
religious values into their corporate or professional decision-making?
As a society, we embrace multiculturalism in many different ways. We
take account of and we accommodate for people's different views and
practices. I think that religious views and approaches ought also to be
accommodated, at the very least through stakeholder statutes that allow
corporate decision-makers to take into consideration the interests of a
variety of different constituencies, not just the profit-maximization
motive.
Although some stakeholder statutes are deficient, the critical point
is that many states throughout the country already have acknowledged
that it is permissible statutorily to allow decision-makers to consider a
variety of factors. Certainly religious factors ought to be equally
respected.
You are probably all familiar with Festinger's theory of cognitive
dissonance. 32 Basically, he argues that if you are forced to do something
that you feel is morally repugnant, you build up emotional dissonance;
you become emotionally distressed. It is difficult to deal with doing
something you think is wrong.33 Consequently, you try to find a way to
escape, a way to avoid the unsavory conduct. But if as a practical matter
you are unable to change your conduct, then you seek refuge from your
cognitive dissonance by changing your opinions.34 What once seemed
immoral now seems quite acceptable, perhaps even laudatory. Your
views change because you have to cope with this emotional stress.35
Jewish law long ago recognized this psychological phenomenon.
Jewish law declares that a person is the product of his actions (nifal lifie
pe 'ulotov).36 A person's moral choices and deeds shape the person's
character and, thereby, importantly inform his or her future exercise of
moral judgment. As a consequence, a system of role-differentiated
32. LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (Stanford Univ. Press
1957); see also Leon Festinger & J.M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced




36. See Sefer HaChinuch.
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morality which calls for one set of rules when you are wearing your
business suit (or acting as an accountant or as an attorney), and another
set of rules when you are acting as a "private" human being is
inconsistent with Judaism in two ways. First, Judaism rejects the notion
that one's profession fundamentally alters one's moral responsibilities in
any particular case. Second, Judaism believes that a system that allows
a person to act less ethically in his or her corporate or professional life
would deleteriously impact that person's overall moral make-up.
At one point in his remarks, Dean Sargent assumed that many
people are privately moral, and his question was: why is it that that
private morality gets bracketed in the corporate setting? I tend to
disagree with his basic assumption. I tend to think that a lot of people
are not privately moral when it comes to civil matters, business matters,
and that this is the problem. Even when they interact with people
outside of a corporate setting, they are too often insensitive to those
people's financial interests and rights. As a consequence, I think that the
problem is the need both for moral education and for statutes that would
provide flexibility for those people who have developed moral
sensitivities and would enable them to comport themselves in a manner
consistent with those sensibilities in the workplace and in the corporate
setting.
Let me now tell you a little bit about what I had planned to speak
about, which was about Judaism's approach to business ethics in general
and how that general approach applies to the corporate setting,
specifically as to corporate governance and governmental intervention.
I have co-authored several publications that you will see in your
conference materials regarding Jewish law's perspective of a
corporation. In addition, I think there are two articles in the package
about the moral problems that confront a Jewish attorney.37 In this
presentation, I will only mention a few fundamental issues.
Judaism's general approach is a communitarian one. We believe
there is God, there are individuals, and there is community, and there are
relationships among and between these three. Each individual has duties
to God, to other individuals, and to the community. What are these
duties and how do they apply to the corporate setting?
37. Michael J. Broyde & Steven H. Resnicoff, Jewish Law and Modern Business
Structures: The Corporate Paradigm, 43 WAYNE L. REv. 1685 (1997).
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For example, we are enjoined to emulate God;38 we must walk in
His ways.39 Therefore, we must give charity,40 and we must do other
good deeds.4 1 We have to also help create a community. 42 One of the
responsibilities that Judaism recognizes as applicable to all people,
whether Jewish or not, is the requirement to establish a system of
justice.43 Everybody has to have a system of justice, all peoples. It is a
divine decree, one the seven Noachide Laws, the laws given to Noah
after the Flood and is applicable to everyone.'
But more than that, we have affirmative duties to save people from
harm: lo ta "amod al dam re 'ekhah (do not stand idly by your fellow's
blood). 45 This applies not just to physical injury, but to financial loss as
well.
Suppose there is a corporation that is selling defective dialysis
46machines, as was true in an Illinois case, and you are its attorney. You
38. See Sifri 49. According to Sifri, "your G-d, to walk in all His ways and to
cleave to Him" (Leviticus 11:22) is the source for the commandment to emulate God.
In his Guide for the Perplexed (1:54), Rambam teaches that the commandment to
emulate Hashem entails the duty to contemplate His 13 Attributes (Shemot 34:6-7, Rosh
Hashanah 17b); which do not describe His Essence, but rather the ways in which He
interacts with the world.
39. See Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Sotah 14a: R. Hama son of R. Hanina said:
"After the Lord your God shall you walk" (Deuteronomy 13:5).
40. See Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Sukkah 49b: R. Eleazar stated, "Greater is he
who performs tzedakah than [he who offers] all the sacrifices, for it is said, To do
tzedek (justice), and justice is more acceptable to the Lord than sacrifice."
41. Id. R. Eleazar further stated, Gemilut Chasadim (deeds of loving kindness) is
greater than tzedakah, for it is said, "Sow to yourselves according to your tzedakah, but
reap according to your chesed. If a man sows, it is doubtful whether he will eat [the
harvest] or not, but when a man reaps, he will certainly eat."
42. See Exodus 23:5; see also CHOFETZ CHAIM, THE CONCISE BOOK OF MITZVOTH:
THE COMMANDMENTS WHICH CAN BE OBSERVED TODAY (Feldheim 1990) (compilation
of the 613 commandments of Judaism, of which many are focused on community
relations).
43. See Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin 56a; see also Maimonides,
Hilchos Melachim 9:1.
44. See Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin 58b.
45. Leviticus 19:16.
46. Loverling Jr. v. Baxter International, Inc., No. O1L-014627 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook
Cty.).
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remonstrate with corporate management and you tell them, "You cannot
sell these machines; people's lives are at stake." If they do not listen,
then you have a duty to disclose. In some states secular rules would
compel you to disclose. In others, secular rules might not require
disclosure. But Jewish law would mandate disclosure.
Even if the professional ethics rules in your jurisdiction would say
that you may not disclose, Jewish law would require disclosure. You
have the duty to save the lives of the prospective users of these
machines. You cannot shirk your ethical responsibilities to these people
by virtue of the profession you have chosen for yourself.
Another example of a basic Jewish dictate that applies in the
business setting is the rule against placing a stumbling block in front of
the blind.47 The Talmudic sages explain that this injunction forbids two
distinct things.48 On the one hand,, it prohibits a person from enabling
another to commit a wrongdoing. In addition, it forbids a person from
intentionally giving bad advice to somebody because such advice will
also cause a person to stumble and sustain a loss. Thus, if you are a
salesperson, you may not convince people to buy something that is not
what they need, not what they want, or not what is good for them.
Jewish law also forbids a person from misleading another.49
Therefore, you must be careful with your advertisements.50 You may
not defame someone, so you may not unduly disparage someone else's
products.5' You may not enable other people to commit sins, so you
may not bribe someone to breach fiduciary duties owed to others.5 2 You
may not provide support to people who do evil and you may not
encourage them. Therefore, for instance, you may not buy stolen
goods. 53  You have a duty to respect people's privacy;54 as a
47. Leviticus 19:14; see also Maimonides, Sefer HaMitzvos - Negative Mitzvah
299.
48. See Toras Kohanim on Leviticus 19:14; see also Rashi's commentary on
Leviticus 19:14.
49. Leviticus 19:14 ("Before the blind do not put a stumbling block").
50. RABBI YAIR HOFFMAN, MISGUIDING THE PERPLEXED: THE LAWS OF LIFNEI IVER
212 (2004) (citing the ruling of Rabbi Yisroel Belksy on Tammuz 8, 5764).
51. Exodus 23:1 ("You shall not utter a false report").
52. See Exodus 23:8 (prohibiting bribes generally).
53. Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 369:1; Rambam Hilchos Gnaivah and
Avaida 5:1.
54. See Rabbi Aaron Tendler - Business Halacha, http://www.torah.org/advanced/
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consequence, you may not engage in industrial espionage. 5
How do these prohibitions or obligations affect corporate conduct?
As I have said, each individual is responsible for his or her conduct, and
it does not matter if the individual is an employee or a fiduciary in a
business or profession.
And a person cannot escape accountability by contending that he or
she is merely somebody else's agent. There is no agency in Jewish law
regarding the commission of a wrong. 6 If you commit a wrong, you are
morally culpable; it does not matter who sent you.5 7 Of course, whoever
encouraged or directed you to commit the wrong also bears guilt, but
that guilt does not absolve you.
Basically, how does Jewish law perceive corporations? The
conference materials contain at least part of an extensive law review
article that I co-authored on this subject, and I cannot even attempt to
summarize that analysis here. Nevertheless, for our immediate
purposes, suffice it to say that individuals who are shareholders are
either perceived as "owners" of the corporation, and, as such, are treated
under Jewish law as partners in a partnership, or they are not.
If a shareholder is an owner, then he or she is responsible for
damage caused by corporate property. As a result, shareholders would
be morally responsible for ensuring that the corporation does not sell
dangerously defective goods and that the corporate workplace does not
expose employees to health risks. Whether owners or not, however,
shareholders, as individuals, are responsible to intervene, when possible,
to protect prospective victims of wrongdoing and to encourage
wrongdoers (whether corporate officers or employees) to change their
ways.
Corporate officers and employees, of course, personally bear
responsibility under Jewish law for the actions they take - toward other
business-halacha/5757/vol2nol7.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2006) (for an interesting
discussion on contemporary issues regarding right to privacy).
55. See The Jewish Ethicist, http://www.besr.org/ethicist/privateeye.html (last
visited Jan. 23, 2006) (relating Rabbi Yaakov Chagiz's analogy between the Leviticus
19:16 prohibition on talebearing to industrial espionage).
56. Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Kiddushin 42b ("ain shliach l'davar aveirah").
57. See id.
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officers and employees, suppliers and others - throughout the daily
discharge of their corporate duties.
At this point in history, Judaism has no centralized human or
institutional hierarchy now. The Sanhedrin ha-Gadol, which was Jewish
law's highest judicial and legislative authority, has been in desuetude for
approximately 2,000 years. The Israeli Chief Rabbi is a political
position - held, of course, by outstanding individuals - but still a
political position. Consequently, there is no extant authoritative
institutional mechanism for resolving many of the particularized
disputes that arise in Jewish law.
Nevertheless, there is a consensus among Jewish law authorities as
to the following basic options. One: under Jewish law, corporate actors
and professionals all have many, many ethical duties to fulfill as
individuals, which secular law does not impose. One reason why
secular law may not prescribe more duties is its attitude of "moral
relativism." Secular law often avoids taking positions as to what is right
or wrong. As a result, it imposes minimalist duties on corporate and
professional actors. Although Judaism believes that a corporation has a
legitimate interest in maximizing profit, it has strong notions as to the
types of conduct that are ethical. A corporation may only pursue profit
maximization by means that do not offend Judaism's ethical
requirements.58  Moreover, Judaism has always recognized the
community's obligation and authority to impose decrees, to require that
one act "beyond the letter of law."
59
What we need is for secular society to recognize the importance of
encouraging more ethical conduct. Secular law needs to enact statutes
that impose those specific standards on which we, as a community, can
agree (and it is my belief that such agreement can and should be reached
on a number of items), as well as to statutes to allow individuals the
flexibility to follow their religious scruples in their professional lives
and to protect them when they do so.
I am almost out of time. I want to mention just one more point
regarding the desirability for secular protection for those who, in their
professional lives, choose to act morally. Remember the Illinois case I
mentioned about defective dialysis machines. In that case the lawyer
58. See generally Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat.
59. This concept is called lifnim mishuras hadin in the Talmud.
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was fired. He then sued for wrongful discharge. The Illinois Supreme
Court took what I think was a very, very unreasonable approach and
demonstrated a poor ability to judge human nature. It said, first of all,
that the attorney was required by Illinois law to disclose the
corporation's misconduct. Then it said that, since the attorney was
required to disclose, the court did not need to provide him protection in
the form of a cause of action for wrongful discharge. 60 Essentially the
court said that protection is only given to encourage people to disclose.
Protection is not provided simply to shield people who have acted
correctly. While we obligate you to do what is good, if you, in fact, do
it, you are on your own.61
I am afraid that this type of approach will not effectively induce
ethically correct conduct. We need a different kind of rule; one that will
encourage people to act properly and protect them a bit when they do.
PROF. PEARCE: Thank you.
Our speakers have given us a lot to think about, and there is
certainly some difference of opinion on a variety of issues.
What I would like to do, even though we only have about ten or
fifteen minutes left in this session, is first see if there are folks who are
sitting here who would like to ask questions or comment to the speakers.
Yes, Bob?
QUESTION: A question for Brad. It would seem that the
arguments of Rawls and others are more persuasive when you are
talking about a state course of action because there is no ability to opt-
out. In the corporate context, isn't there always an ability to opt-out, in
the sense that you, if you are a corporate lawyer, as long as you make
transparent the process by which your values are coming into your
decision-making, the client can walk away and say, "I am not interested
in that. I am going to get another lawyer." If you are a corporate
decision-maker, if you are the principal, and you are transparent, the
investors can pull their money out and say, "Hey, we want a money-
making company, not a religious values company." So doesn't that take
the bite out of their arguments?
60. See supra note 46.
61. See id.
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PROF. WENDEL: Absolutely, and I think it is really important to
focus on the emphasis on coercion. Once you get outside of coercion,
you no longer have this liberal problem where you are imposing your
will on others and limiting their autonomy. I think that is exactly right.
You know, in the lawyer-client relationship, what I worry about is
lawyers acting covertly. So the fact that you said lawyers act
transparently, sure, I have no problem with that at all. The lawyering
rules - those of you who are lawyers know this - provide permission
and authority for lawyers to counsel their clients based on non-legal
considerations, and it specifically says social, political, and moral
considerations. So there is absolutely nothing wrong in an attorney-
client relationship of a lawyer seeking to persuade the client on the basis
of religious values, nothing wrong with that at all.
And there is nothing wrong with the corporate manager saying,
"This corporation shall henceforth be guided by the principles of
Catholic social thought as understood by the writings of So-and-So."
That is fine. And if the investors want to pull their money, that is their
business; and if people want to leave the corporation, that is fine; or if
investors want to invest, that is fine. There is no coercion.
Without coercion, this whole Rawlsian problem just does not get
started. So that is one of the things that are important to keep in mind.
This is a fairly limited argument. I think sometimes the liberal political
argument is taken as a sweeping preclusion of religious values from the
public space, but it is not. It is only a preclusion insofar as one acts
coercively to limit the autonomy of others.
DEAN SARGENT: Well, there is Rawls and there are Rawlsians.
The coercion distinction certainly reflects an accurate reading of Rawls.
The broader version of it one hears, however, is not limited to the
coercion problem but incorporates the notion that faith-based discourse
and the invocation of religious principles in support of a position are
somehow always illegitimate in the public debate, in the public
conversation. As a practical matter, there are many religious voices
which in fact are heard in public debate.
But for those espousing a crude or vulgar Rawlsianism there is a
tendency to exclude faith-based discourse not because it is
unconvincing, but because of its inherent truth claims.
PROF. PEARCE: Okay. Other questions from the floor? Yes?
QUESTION: You spoke of the need at the end of your excellent
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comments for incentives and protection, and implicitly for the lawyers.
How would you feel about increasing the requirement? What I mean by
that stems from my supposition and my earlier practice, that the lawyer
is very often the architect, the innovator, the inventor, the entrepreneur,
of particularly some of our most sophisticated and unlawful financial
dealings, but the lawyer seldom gets drawn into the indictment and the
penalty for that. Query: how would you feel about increasing the
obligations or the penalties imposed on the legal profession for straying
into those practices?
PROF. RESNICOFF: I would be in favor of such changes. Let me
explain why. I would favor them because I think a lot of the problems
occur from the education that people have gotten through the system; an
education that encourages them to ignore the real ethical circumstances
in which they practice and to focus solely on employing their intellectual
powers to promote their clients' interests. For example, in law school
we teach people all the time to be creative; to be creative about the
arguments they may raise and, about the analytical frameworks they
may propound. Unfortunately, too many students think they can be
creative about the facts as well. For example, consider a case in which a
corporate resolution does not bear the actual date on which it was in fact
acted upon. Instead, for "strategic" reasons, it bears an earlier date. A
student (or attorney) might question whether there is anything wrong
with this practice. They might suggest that perhaps the person who
dated the document meant only to say that the resolution was enacted
"as of' the earlier date, as if such an intention would made a difference.
While we must continue to encourage creative and imaginative
argument and analysis, we should require corporate actors and
professionals to evaluate objectively what they and their clients are
actually doing and impose specific ethical duties in response to such
assessments.
And although I favor discretionary rules to provide flexibility and
protection for those who want to do more than the minimum, I think it is
important to have mandatory rules for those whose natural inclination
may be to shut their eyes to the wrongdoing surrounding them. And such
mandatory rules certainly must be backed by meaningful sanctions.
PROF. PEARCE: Do either of you want to address that? Go ahead,
568 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. XI
FINANCIAL LAW
Brad.
PROF. WENDEL: I was just going to raise the point that with
respect to a lot of the corporate scandals we are talking about now, the
law is as stringent as it needs to be. It just was not followed. And so the
question is: how do you motivate people to pay attention to the law?
I am writing a paper about the Enron case and I am trying to find
one of the transactions in which there is a plausible judgment call that a
lawyer could have gone either way on, and I am running out of ideas.
Every one that I look at is an out-and-out fraud when you actually look
at it carefully. And so there is no question about exercising moral
judgment to preclude one of these transactions. It is just a matter of if
the lawyers had been motivated to actually comply with existing rules,
they would have done so.
The law is fairly stringent, and I think we will see that as these
shareholder suits get worked out, the suits against the secondary actors,
and also the malpractice claims against the lawyers that the Bankruptcy
Trustee is going to bring. The Fourth Report of the Bankruptcy
Examiner is really outstanding on that. It shows that the law is already
plenty tight; the question is just what motivation do professionals have
to comply with it, as opposed to trying to throw up an obfuscating
smokescreen to prevent the transactions from actually being examined
with any kind of scrutiny?
PROF. PEARCE: Mark?
DEAN SARGENT: I would agree with that. When you do look at
the transactions in a lot of these cases, Enron in particular, you are not
usually finding a situation in which there was a good-faith determination
that this could go one way or the other. Instead, it was an indifference to
what was probably an illegal transaction.
You do get the kind of problem where the advice was entirely
legitimate but the transaction had bad consequences, though. For
example, look at the concentration of Enron's stock in the 401(k) plans.
The ERISA lawyers who gave advice on that were, I think, giving
correct advice about something that was perfectly legal. The rules did
permit that kind of concentration of Enron's stock.
That turned out to be a disaster when Enron cratered. Also, the
Enron managers were probably deceptive in the way that they marketed
their own stock to their employees. But the lawyers who authorized that
level of concentration were not doing anything wrong.
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But when you get to the SPE transactions and the disclosures
associated with them, the lawyers involved either knew or should have
known that those transactions involved unjustifiable conflicts of interest.
That I think will come out in the wash in the cases involving secondary
liability.
A closer question is the various tax shelter transactions around the
country, not just in Enron, involving the aggressive use of SPEs in
which the lawyers, accounting firms, and investment bankers all acted
collectively to promote these deals, with the lawyers actually giving the
tax opinions on them, asserting their validity, even though they
obviously had a promotional interest in making sure that the deals got
done.
There you are really on the bleeding edge of what was legitimate
for a lawyer to be doing. Whether that is going to turn into a question of
liability is not clear. So that might be a closer case than what turned out
to be actual fraud that Brad mentioned.
PROF. PEARCE: Mark, I wanted to follow up as well and ask you
a question that came out of what I think I heard Steve saying. I
apologize, Steve, if I am going to paraphrase you incorrectly. But I
think Steve was suggesting that the lawyers in your moral maze, or the
persons in your moral maze, who allowed the corporate culture to shape
their morality, were folks who did not have a strong sense of morality in
the first place. I wonder what your response to that would be.
DEAN SARGENT: Well, to a certain extent I was giving them the
benefit of the doubt, assuming at least for the sake of argument that they
did have a personal morality, whether religious or secular. So I am not
sure I entirely agree or entirely disagree with Steve.
Let's put it this way. Obviously, there were people involved, are
people involved, in these situations who are moral ciphers, who really
do not possess anything that could be defined as a deeply-thought-out
and lived morality based on religious premises or secular premises of
any kind whatsoever. If you are that kind of person, the moral rules in
use prevailing in the occupational setting are going to govern what you
say, what you do, and there is no cognitive dissonance whatsoever.
However, I like to believe that most people, or at least a fair number
of people, really do try to do "the right thing." They may not have a
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very sophisticated moral formation - although some may - but they at
least have a sense of decency which, at least at some level, may lead
them to experience cognitive dissonance, but which is overcome by the
enormous force of the occupational rules in use.
So I guess one thing we can say, to the extent that we have both
kinds of people in a situation - that is, people not bringing a personal
morality to the table and people who do - they are both vulnerable,
although to differing degrees, to the overpowering force of the social
context, rules in use.
PROF. PEARCE: Okay. A question?
QUESTION: I had a reaction to Dean Sargent's remarks in which
he cited this author who apparently characterizes the corporation as sort
of a pit in which these broad human weaknesses and worst possible
motivations and so on are displayed. I am here to plead the corporate
case.
First of all, corporations have personalities and characteristics. All
of them then have a style and, increasingly in this period of corporate
scandals that we are seeing, a code of conduct, and that is set by the
leadership at the top. I have been fortunate to have interviewed any
number of major corporate CEOs and chairmen and we discussed the
morality, the best sense of values, and so on, that each individual
attempts to bring to the entity which he leads.
I particularly want to talk about Sy Sternberg, who is the Chairman
and CEO of a 250-year-old company called New York Life, an
insurance company. He talked about his childhood, growing up in
Brooklyn, in which his mother told him that if he ever lied she would
kill him. He said to this day he is literally unable to lie. That mentality,
that point of view, which is imbued in this man, he brings to this
corporation.
So we have to think that there are literally thousands of
corporations in this country that are run in a manner which is with a
sense of values and a sense of goodness. We must not forget that in all
of these discussions.
DEAN SARGENT: Well, I do not disagree with that. One possible
response to Jackall must be "they can not all be that bad." The
companies that he studied in the textile and the chemical industries were
extremely troubled, in tremendous conflict with the environmental and
regulatory authorities, and seemed to have developed particularly malign
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cultures. As everybody is not a saint, not everybody is a sinner, at least
to that degree.
On the other hand, the CEO of Global Crossing was a devout
Christian, who after all of this came out, went to his congregation down
in Mississippi and made a sort of Nixonian "I am not a crook" speech.
And Mr. Kozlowski at Tyco gave a lot of money to Catholic institutions
and was thought to be personally devout.
So it is difficult to know what to make of the way CEOs describe
themselves when one looks at the pervasive fraud that we experienced at
the very highest levels of elite corporations throughout the United States
in the last few years.
I think what we can say is that, as I mentioned a moment ago, most
people do try to do the right thing, and they do not always succumb, and
sometimes that sense of decency is in fact institutionalized in
corporations. But what I think Jackall points out is that the
organizational setting of a corporation, what he describes as its
bureaucratic character, produces almost inevitably pressures towards
certain kinds of behavior that tend to force people who were raised
decently and who think of themselves as decent people to act in ways
that are profoundly antisocial.
I should add that this sort of thing happens inside universities as
well, so I do not want to describe corporations as uniquely malign in that
regard.
So I agree with the reservation. I do not want to paint everybody
with the same brush. But I think it is important to recognize how the
social structure itself produces problems that are very difficult for decent
people to overcome.
PROF. PEARCE: On that note, we are going to take a ten-minute
break. We will convene at 10:15 for our keynote lecture. See you then.
Thank you again so much to the panelists.
[Break: 10:00 to 10:21.]
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INTRODUCTION
MS. UELMEN: I think we will get started for our second session
here. We are very privileged and appreciative to have with us two
international guests, one of whom is our Keynote Speaker, Stefano
Zamagni.
* Professor Stefano Zamagni is Professor of Economics at the University of Bologna,
Italy, and visiting professor at several universities in Italy and the United States. Since
1990, Professor Zamagni has been a consultant to the Pontifical Council on Justice and
Peace. From 1996 to 2001, he has been the representative of the Italian Bishops'
Conference to the Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of the European
Community in Brussels. In 1980, Professor Zamagni became Adjunct Professor of
Public Economics at the Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University, and remains
in this post.
- Dr. Henry Schwalbenberg, PhD, Columbia, who is an Assistant Professor of
Economics at Fordham University, is also Director of the Masters Program in
International Political Economy and Development at Fordham University.
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I have already teased him about a mistake in his biographical
information contained in the materials. It says he has been teaching
since 980 rather than 1980. We all know that the universities in Europe
are old, but I'm sure some of you didn't realize that the professors also
can teach for over a millennium.
Professor Zamagni has been also associated with the Bologna
Center of the Johns Hopkins University. He is in the Department of
Economics at the University of Bologna. He has published extensively,
written hundreds of articles and books, most recently, Civil Economy,'
with another of our panelists today, Luigino Bruni. 2 He is also the co-
editor of a number of very important journals and on editorial boards.
Since 1991, he has been a member of the Pontifical Council for Justice
and Peace, and then from 1994 to 1996 a member of the Steering
Committee for the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences in Vatican
City.
One of my friends corrected me for stating that this portion of the
conference is from an economist's perspective; it should be noted that
Professor Zamagni can provide a theologian's and a philosopher's
perspective as well.
Professor Zamagni is also the President of the International
Catholic Migration Commission, a Fellow of the New York Academy of
Sciences, and has been asked to put forward candidates for the Nobel
Prize in Economics. His economics degree is from the University of
Milan and his graduate study was at Oxford University.
We are very privileged to have Professor Zamagni with us today.
His address will be followed by a response by Professor Henry
Schwalbenberg, who is an Associate Professor of Economics here at
Fordham and also the Director of the Graduate Program in International
Political Economy and Development. Professor Schwalbenberg has
been honored for his skills as a teacher. His research interests focus on
North-South capital flows, political economy and trade development.
He has traveled extensively and has done extensive work in the
international field.
We will proceed with the Keynote and with the Response, but then
we will also leave time for discussion and questions.
1. STEFANO ZAMAGNI & LUIGINO BRUNI, ECONOMIA CIVILE, I1 Mulino, Bologna
(2004).
2. See Essay infra.
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I am pleased to present Professor Stefano Zamagni.
PROF. ZAMAGNI: Thank you very, very much. I am very pleased
to be here with you in this location, so let me express my gratitude to
Fordham University and in particular to Amy, who was instrumental for
my coming here.
In this presentation - I have also prepared a paper, but I am not
going to read it so I will keep to the time allocated to me - in this
presentation I will address two basic questions.
The first question is: How can we account for the fact that in the
last couple of decades the issue of corporate social responsibility has
emerged not only in the policymaking arena but also in the academic
arena? In other words, why is it that today we talk so insistently about
corporate social responsibility in a way which was unknown until, let's
say, fifteen or twenty years ago?
The second question is: What types of responses have been given,
or are being given, today to this demand for corporate social
responsibility that is emerging in cultural debate as well as in academic
debate?
Now, first of all, let me clarify a point on which there is a lot of
confusion. People tend to confuse corporate social responsibility with
the much older model of corporate philanthropy but the two are
completely different things.
Corporate philanthropy is not a novel arrangement. Since the
emergence of capitalistic society, corporate philanthropy always existed.
The idea behind corporate philanthropy is that of an alliance between
for-profit and not-for-profit, such that some capital can be used to
benefit the not-for-profit organizations. That said, an enterprise can
involve itself in corporate philanthropy and still not be socially
responsible. The fact is that, while the logic of a philanthropic
enterprise is one of concession or compassion, corporate social
responsibility rests on the principle of equal dignity of all subjects
involved in a business activity - from the setting of goals to the
fulfillment of the entrepreneurial plan.
In other words, one can observe that business leaders have always
realized that to assure workers better living conditions means to
stimulate in them a sense of loyalty and identification with the goals of
the enterprise and in this way to elevate levels of production. The same
can be said for attention to other classes of stakeholders. It is enough to
think of the entrepreneurial vicissitude of Walter Rathenau, the founder
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of AEG,3 or of Adrian Olivetti.4 Even Henry Ford declared, in a 1919
interview, that "an enterprise that aims to make nothing more than
money is a truly modest enterprise." 5
The issue of social commitment is not confined to the present
historical phase which we can characterize as the age of globalization.
On the other hand, the basic difference between social commitment or
corporate philanthropy and corporate social responsibility is that the
wider philanthropic enterprise is one which has a concession of
compassion. Corporate social responsibility rests on the principle of the
equal dignity of all the subjects involved in a business activity.
The novelty of corporate social responsibility is not in the degree of
altruism or broadmindedness, but in the way in which the business
affairs are handled - a way which rejects paternalism, even illuminated
paternalism, and above all in the way in which it responds to a call for
an accounting of its activities. This last point is really the earth-
shattering novelty of the socially responsible enterprise. In a sense,
"social commitment" is not a distinctive feature of socially responsible
enterprise, because that has always been present, even though more or
less practiced. In the same way, social responsibility is to be
distinguished from legal responsibility. Always, since their inception,
firms have had to be legally responsible.
So the question then is: Why is it that businesses today are looking
3. Walter Rathenau, 1867-1922, was the president of the German company AEG
(Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft). Mr. Rathenau was known for his attempts to
find an alternative to laissez-faire capitalism that did not involve state socialism and
Marxism. In doing so, he proposed a decentralized, democratic social order, in which
the workers would have more control over production and the state would exert more
control over the economy. For more information visit http://www.bartleby.com/
65/ra/Rathenau.html (last visited March 21, 2005).
4. Adriano Olivetti, 1901-1960, was the Chairman of Ing. C. Olivetti & C., S.p.A.,
the Italian typewriter and electronics manufacturer. Mr. Olivetti was an entrepreneur,
intellectual, publisher and town planner with a keen interest in social problems. He
extended his activities well beyond the confines of the industrial world. He
commissioned new factories, offices, employee housing, canteens and nurseries and
developed a comprehensive system of social services. More information can be found
at http://storiaolivetti.telecomitalia.it/uk/cgi-bin/Societa/storia.asp (last visited March
21, 2005).
5. The exact quotation is that "[a] business that makes nothing but money is a
poor business," available at http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/HenryFord (last visited
March 1, 2006).
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for social legitimization in a way which was unknown in the past? I can
offer three basic reasons to answer this question.
One has to do with the fact that in the last quarter of a century non-
profit organizations - which the Fourth International Society for Third-
Sector Research Conference in the year 2000 termed "civil society
organizations ' 6 - have applied in practice not only the idea but the
instruments of social corporate responsibility. The practice of socially
responsible enterprise as it is understood today is very similar to the
ways in which civil society organizations operate, which since their
beginning have fulfilled - perhaps without even realizing it - what
today is being asked of business. The logic and action of non-profits
have penetrated, albeit gradually, into the logic and action of for-profit
business. For instance, the so-called "social report" was invented by
non-profit organizations.
So here we have a case where the logic and the action of non-profit
organizations have penetrated or contaminated - it is an application of
the principle of contamination, as moral philosophers say - the logic
and the action of for-profit business. This reveals that one may be
efficient and generate value even if the objectives include, in addition to
profit maximization, other variables which take into consideration
broader collective interests.7 What comes into relief is that the
expansion and proliferation of civil society organizations convince -
although this is debatable - that efficiency and effectiveness can
proceed in equal step; indeed that businesses succeed in as much as they
6. International Society for Third-Sector Research, http://www.istr.org/
conferences/dublin/index.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2006).
7. See Thomas W. Dunfee, Corporate Governance in a Market with Morality, 62
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 132 (1999) (suggesting that a convergence does exist
between these views when properly considered, so that managers will more effectively
satisfy their primary duty to shareholders when they respond to signals of significant
moral preferences within capital, consumer, and labor markets relevant to the firm).
Managers have a further obligation, based on a social contract, to act consistently with
mandatory marketplace morality and manifest universal norms. Id. at 157. See also
Cheryl F. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship Between the Directorial
Duty of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. PI-r. L. REv. 389 (2002). Wade
describes the work of Cyrus Mehri, a discrimination class action lawyer, work from the
perspective of corporate governance. Id. She discusses corporate disclosures regarding
employment discrimination/diversity practices as a policy that is both responsive to
market forces and widely held social and ethical norms. Id. Wade describes such a
policy as "profit-maximizing." Id. at 440.
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are able to respond to multiple secondary objectives not limited to the
profit motive.8  It shouldn't be surprising that the lexicon for
categorizing the philosophy on which social responsibility is based has
changed at the same pace as the experience of civil society has matured.
As you know, Milton Friedman, in a famous statement which I believe
he made to the New York Times in an interview published in 1970, said:
There is one, and only one, social responsibility of business, to use
its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profit as
long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say engages
in open and free competition without deception or fraud, so as to
produce wealth and work for all in the most efficient way possible.
9
If Friedman were right - and he is not right, as nowadays we can
say - it is obvious then a non-profit organization cannot be considered
socially responsible, because if the mark of social responsibility is to
maximize profit, it is obvious that non-profit organizations - and in this
country, most universities, most hospitals, are such - should not be
considered enterprises, or better to say entities capable of generating
value added. Already at this stage of the argument we notice how the
emergence of the non-profit sector has changed the usual way of
conceptualizing the role and the identity of an enterprise.
The second reason of the three has to do with the fact that among
the various implications of globalization there is one which deserves our
attention in this context, namely the demise of Taylorism - of that
particular mode to organize the productive process whose basic
principles were rigorously formulated in the book published in 1911 by
Taylor. "
Now, what does imply the end of Taylorism? It implies that most
labor relations within organizations are idiosyncratic. That is a novelty
of the last quarter of a century or so, which did not exist in the past.
Now, what does it mean that labor relations are idiosyncratic? It
means that knowledge is becoming more and more tacit. In other words,
the knowledge is inside the brains of the people working in an
organization and there is no way to extract the knowledge which is in
8. Id.
9. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is To Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970.
10. FREDERICKW. TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (191 1).
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the minds of the people, unless they are willing to.
Under Taylorism, life was much easier because what the
corporation needed to obtain from the workers was essentially a labor
force." But in a knowledge society, as we are accustomed to call the
present-day society, that is no longer the case. I mean that a firm cannot
successfully compete in the globalized market unless it is innovative and
creative.
What does that imply? It implies that the coercive methods to
extract effort from the employees are not paying nowadays. In the past,
they paid. The use of sanctions was, as we know from economic
history, a very common affair to penalize those who were not able to
respect the time allocated to them, and the other rules.
What has been the remedy offered by economic theory, in particular
by agency theory? Incentive mechanisms. If the firm wants to extract
from its collaborators the knowledge that they bring with them then the
manager has to offer them a proper incentive scheme. That is the
argument that we find in most textbooks of microeconomics all over the
world in these days.
Now, what is wrong in my opinion with the incentive scheme
strategy? That incentive schemes are not sustainable in the long run,
and as a consequence they bring corporations to failure, as we are
witnessing in these days in many different parts of the world? Why?
There are two reasons.
One is that incentives are costly. In other words, they are a
component of cost, which is doomed to increase over time. Consider the
case with stock options or stock gift to get the point. The second reason
is more relevant, namely that incentive schemes -there is nowadays a
huge literature proving this - produce what have been called by many
scholars, such as Bruno Frey, Ernest Fehr, Robert Frank, and many
others, the so-called crowding-out effect: the incentives crowd out the
intrinsic motivation of the people working in a firm. 12
In other words, any incentive scheme generates two effects, the
direct effect and the indirect effect. The former one operates via the
11. Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L.
REv. 1276, 1282 (discussing Taylor's conception of the corporate enterprise as being
one that is purely rationalized and mechanical).
12. See, e.g., Bruno S. Frey, Institutions and Morale: The Crowding-Out Effect, in
ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION 437-60 (A. Ben-Ner & L. Putterman eds.
1998) (discussing how incentives can erode intrinsic motivation).
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substitution effect - if I give you an incentive, you work harder and
better. Most people, even those experts in managerial sciences, limit
themselves to the direct effect. It is a mistake however not to consider
the indirect effect, which operates through the motivational system of
the person. If I give you an incentive, it means that I want to "buy"
something from you that you would not have given up otherwise. For
example, I buy your loyalty, or your honesty. But the very moment I
behave in this way, it is obvious that the employee involved will start
bargaining on that and will start blackmailing over time, year after year,
in order to increase the payment. Clearly, at that moment the manager
could not object by saying: "Oh, you are becoming too commercial-
minded," because the employee would say, "You have made me behave
that way."
To conclude on that, one can understand why the systematic use of
incentives might be detrimental in the long run to the firm: the ultimate
reason is that they destroy trust relations among people; and trust is the
cement of any organization, corporations included.
Finally, there is a third reason to answer the question I started with,
how to account for this new phenomenon of corporate social
responsibility. This has to do with a novel fact that consumers in this
epoch of globalization are becoming more and more concerned about the
moral consequences of their choices.13 That is a novelty. Until recently,
a consumer in choosing how to spend his or her money followed the so-
called price/quality ratio. The rational consumer, we keep on teaching
to our students, is the one who for the same level of quality buys the
good at the lower price or, vice-versa, for the same level of price gets the
commodity or the service of higher quality.
The fact is that consumers of today are not happy with that. They
pretend to know how the commodity was produced; i.e. they are
interested also in the process of production and not only in its outcome.
Now, this idea is an old one, goes back to John Stuart Mill, the great
economist and philosopher from England. Already in the middle of the
1 9th century he advanced the concept of consumer sovereignty, but he
was writing too much in advance of his times.
13. Jennifer J. Griffin & John F. Mahon, The Corporate Social Performance and
Corporate Financial Performance Debate: Twenty-Five years of Incomparable
Research, 36 Bus. & SOC'Y 5, 6-7 (1997) (discussing studies that reveal a correlation
between a corporation's social perception as a moral agent and the corporation's
financial performance).
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The idea of Mill was exactly that the consumer deciding to buy or
to spend his or her income in one way or the other sends messages to the
production; hence, ultimately the consumer is sovereign, which means
that it can dictate to the production side not only the menu of the
commodities to be produced but also the way according to which the
consumer wants the commodity to be produced.
Today, the conjecture of John Stuart Mill is becoming vindicated.
Consider the phenomena of boycott or protest advocacy, etc., etc. This
implies moving from the idea of consumer as customer to the idea of
consumer as citizen. The consumer as customer is somebody who
utilizes his or her purchasing power to maximize a utility function under
constraint. The consumer as citizen is somebody who wants more,
wants also to express his or her cultural identity and his or her moral
sentiments - that is the point where religious values enter the scene. So
if I happen to know that a shoe or a balloon is produced in a country
where, for instance, human rights are severely violated, I might object to
buying it even though the price and the quality of the commodity are
good. These are examples that are becoming more and more frequent in
our societies.
To conclude, these are the main reasons helping us to understand
the growing interest, among scholars, policy-makers and entrepreneurs,
around the themes of corporate social responsibility.
I now move to my second question: why is there still a radical
conviction that the goals of business and those of social responsibility
are radically irreconcilable? A superficial and not very convincing
answer is that of opportunism: the business world should have
discovered in modem times that ethical behavior is economically
advantageous. Good ethics is good business, as we often hear. The
adoption by businesses of deontological codes or various practices of
corporate social responsibility - from the social report to various types
of certifications - have merely an instrumental, and therefore
ephemeral, meaning. Certainly one cannot deny that there is much truth
in the more or less radical denunciations of the skeptics. For example,
Enron's 2000 social report cited an obligation to work to promote
mutual respect with the communities and stakeholders affected by the
corporation's operations. Nonetheless, a few examples are not enough
to counter the broader theoretical proposition.
At this point the question arises whether in the context of market
economies as we know them today, it is possible that organizations
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whose modus operandi is founded on the principles of the corporate
social responsibility will be able to survive. For those who follow the
line of thought of Polanyi, Hirschman, Hirsch, and Hollis, to cite a few,
their central thesis is that economic agents, operating in the market
based on the principle of the exchange of equivalents are induced to
adopt exclusively self-interested ways of deliberation. With time they
tend to transfer this approach to other social environments, even to those
for which the public interest would require the adoption of virtuous
actions. It would demand the adoption of virtuous actions. An act is
virtuous not simply because it is in the public interest, but because the
public interest was the motivation for the action.
To the same conclusion, albeit from a different perspective, arrives
Hirschman. To him virtue is understood as a habitual good action, the
values of which increases with the use - or as economists would say, it
has an increasing marginal utility, and as Aristotle taught, it depends on
the individual's acquired habits. It follows that a society which
privileges institutions, economic and not, that they tend to economize on
citizens' virtue is a society that will not only lose its patrimony of virtue,
but it will also find difficult to rebuild it. Virtue, like muscle, atrophies
with the disuse. As Brennan and Hamlin propose with their theory of
moral muscle, a society which economizes in the use of virtues sweeps
away its possibility to produce virtue. 14 The more that a society entrusts
its institutions to the market, the more its cultural features and social
norms will be congruent with the principles of the market.
In an analogous, although more sophisticated analysis, Martin
Hollis 5 explains the paradox of trust, saying that the stronger the binds
of trust are, the more a society progresses; the more it progresses, the
more its members become rational and instrumental in their
relationships; the more instrumental they are in their relationships, the
less they are able to give and receive trust. Therefore the development
of the society erodes the ties that made possible that the society
continuously needs.'
6
We can understand that if these authors were correct, there would
be very little hope for answering positively the question of whether
14. See G. Brennan and A.P. Hamlin, Constitutional Political Economy: The
Political Philosophy of Homo Economicus, 3 J. POL. PHIL. 280, 280-303 (1995).
15. MARTIN HOLLIS, TRUST WITHIN REASON (1998).
16. Id. at 23.
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socially responsible business can survive in the market. But fortunately
the situation is not as desperate as it seems. First, these analyses could
stand if they could demonstrate a causal nexus between dispositions and
institutions that safeguard virtues, a nexus between the strength with
which one may sustain that, operating on the capitalistic market, agents
arrive, with time, to acquire an individualistic way of acting, which
would consist of self-interest plus instrumental rationality. But the fact
is that this has never been demonstrated - in fact, those with virtuous
dispositions who act in institutional contexts in which the rules of the
game they presuppose only self interested behavior and rationality tend
to obtain better results than those moved by egocentric dispositions. For
example, think of the prisoner's dilemma played by subjects who are not
virtuous - as described above - the solution to which one arrives is
suboptimal. The point is that the virtuous agent that operates in a market,
based on the exchange of equivalents "blooms," because he does what
the market rewards and values, even if the reason for which he acts in
this way is not the attainment of such reward. As Brennan and Hamlin17
write, the reward strengthens the inner disposition, because it renders the
exercise of the virtue less costly.
Secondly, for the thesis of Polanyi and other scholars to be valid
one would require that virtuous dispositions follow behaviors, while
exactly the contrary is true. If this were true, how could one explain the
reason why in actual historical conditions dominated by institutions that
economize on virtue, we see as never before a flowering of civil society
organizations? This happens because the nature of that which induces
the actor to behave in a virtuous way is relevant: it makes quite a
difference whether it is because of fear of legal or social sanction or
because it arises from intrinsic motivations. In these cases, the method
of the "revealed preferences," according to which one may infer the
subject's preferences, is not applicable. For example, the observation of
honest behavior does not mean we can infer a person's preference for
honesty - the honest behavior may arise from fear of social disapproval
or of being caught. Nonetheless, if in a given context of social
interaction the honest behavior may emerge as the better or best strategy,
the agents will be induced more easily to behave honestly, and then also
those who were initially motivated by purely opportunistic dispositions,
after a certain experience, could also chose to adopt virtuous
17. See supra note 14.
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dispositions.
As Amartya Sen has convincingly argued in "Reason Before
Identity,"' 8 rational individuals choose their dispositions. The point then
is that in our current context, the practice of corporate social
responsibility can facilitate the possibility of virtuous behavior - in the
sense of civic virtues - which are able to generate optimal results, and
can trigger the mechanisms of choice as I have explained.
One may object - why should self interested agents be influenced
by virtuous agents, and not vice versa, as many others submit? It's a
tough question - but not as difficult as might initially appear. The fact
is - as Schlicht argues - that coordination of the internal decisions of
an enterprise is not based on price mechanisms. With the exception of
the incentives - it is very rare to use price mechanisms within the
enterprise in order to coordinate the division of labor. This does not
respond to the presumed point of departure of the principal-agent theory
- according to which market regulation and internal regulation of the
business are identical. The affirmation of Holmstron, that the business
is nothing other than a specialized market, is reductive and not plausible.
Instead, businesses work with normative structures to assure the internal
coordination of decisions. These norms have an impact on the behavior
of those who work within the business, and in the long run, on their
cognitive map, besides on their character. It would be enough to
consider how most social interactions take place not in the market, but
within the organizations. Compare, for example, the differences
between time spent for acquisitions and that spent in the workplace.
And the central norm around which the organization turns is equity.
A last point, especially important for the context of this conference,
is worth mentioning. What is the ethical anchor for corporate social
responsibility? According to some influential analysis in a recent book
by Steinberg,' 9 the goal of the business isn't to promote the public good
if that nature of the goods or services, or the way in which they are
produced has priority over the long term maximization of profits. In that
case it's no longer a business activity. 2° He goes on to say that just as
prostitution is when sex is for money rather than for love, in that same
18. See AMARTYA SEN, REASON BEFORE IDENTITY: THE ROMANES LECTURE FOR
1998 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999).
19. ELAINE STERNBERG, JUST BUSINESS: BUSINESS ETHICS IN ACTION (2d ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2000).
20. Id. at 36.
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way business prostitutes itself when it pursues love, or social
responsibility, rather than money.2' Clearly, also Steinberg, in the same
line as Friedman, admits the necessity for minimum ethics requirements
which should be respected in the course of business. For this author it is
a matter of distributive justice, to give the concerned parties their due,
and ordinary decency, that is to say, to trust one's collaborators until
there is evidence to the contrary. But respect for such bonds is
acceptable for the business only in as much as it serves for long term
profit maximization.
We need not spend much time on the shallowness of such
arguments. What I'd like to focus on is the paradox at the heart of these
arguments - how is it possible that non cooperative individuals, like
those along the lines of Friedman and Steinberg's descriptions, are able
to cooperate in order to fix the rules they need to build cooperation
within the business? Is such cooperation presumed, or is it the result? If
it is presumed, then the anthropology of individualism which underlies
the argument fails. If instead it is the result, then one would need to
demonstrate just how individualistic agents are able to cooperate as
demonstrated - neither by agency theories, nor by the stakeholder
theories of Friedman and others. I am of the opinion that at this point
our research needs to change its course. The fact is that the various
theories of business ethics are unable to provide a reason for being
ethical.
According to David Lutz,22 the difficulty could be framed in this
way: if it's not good for myself to behave ethically, why not do what is
good for me, instead of doing what is ethically prescribed? 23 On the
other hand, if it is good for me to follow the rules of ethics, why do we
need business ethics at all? My thesis is that remaining within the
horizons of ontological individualism, there is no way to untangle the
knot. It is fruitless to look for solutions to the problem of moral
motivation when ethics is understood as a set of rules, and therefore to
try to persuade management with incentives and sanctions to act in
accordance with this set of rules. If ethics becomes a part of the
objective function of the agent, this itself will be the automatic
21. Id. at 42.
22. See generally David W. Lutz, Beyond Business Ethics (2003), available at
http://www.pust.edu/oikonomia/pages/2003/2003_giugno/pdf/studi_2.pdf.
23. See id. at 67.
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motivation to do what seems to be right. It's a matter of understanding
that virtuous behavior - in the sense discussed previously - is the
better, not only for the others, but also for oneself.
This is why cultivating civic virtues is the undeniable task not only
from the point of view of citizenship - something known for a long
time - but also from the point of view of CSR. Since institutions,
contrary to what the theorists of market fundamentals think, influence
economic performance also in the long-term, the task is to intervene in
the institutional set-up of society in order to encourage - and not
penalize, as happens stupidly today - the largest possible dissemination
of civic virtues through education and actual deeds. The results will
then follow, notwithstanding what the skeptic thinks. For the skeptic the
managers, under pressure from the movement of ideas that have come
about around CSR, will attempt to imitate or mimic behavior inspired by
the ethic of virtues, though continuing to not really believe. This way -
the skeptic reasons - market competition will select, according to the
circumstances those corporate cultures which are founded on those
values that will demonstrate to be most profitable. Today we know,
both theoretically and empirically, that things do not proceed this way.
The "cynical" manager who, without believing it, behaves like a
"virtuous" manager, sooner or later will begin to perceive
himself/herself as homo reciprocans - just as the theory of self-
attribution teaches - stopping from behaving in a merely opportunistic
way. Therefore, if the market is capable of recompensating in a
coherent way what I call the civil culture of the firm, in the long run
both the dispositional and the motivational structure of the economic
agents - managers included - will adapt as a consequence. This is not
an insignificant advantage of the approach of moral evolution according
to which the affirmation of the values of CSR ultimately depends on the
process through which these values are edified as virtues.
Thank you so much for your attention.
PROF. SCHWALBENBERG: Let me begin with a quick, little
summary and then I will pick one point and then develop it.
The theme here was corporate social responsibility, why was this
coming about. I guess the example of the non-profits in meeting
different social, educational, and welfare needs. The idea of having a
mission that will then get your workforce to be more productive and
actually replace a cruder incentive system. And that the consumer is
demanding it. Therefore, we have the argument that maybe we should
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coming about. I guess the example of the non-profits in meeting
different social, educational, and welfare needs. The idea of having a
mission that will then get your workforce to be more productive and
actually replace a cruder incentive system. And that the consumer is
demanding it. Therefore, we have the argument that maybe we should
KEYNOTE ADDRESS: ZAMAGNI
have a deeper system of reciprocity to replace our cruder market system
that we mainstream economists love and cherish.
What I want to do is pick up on the consumer demands it and
replace the word "consumer" with "citizen." Then what I want to do is
go back to 1776, to Adam Smith, and try to get a sense of what we mean
by economics. You know, we have to define what we mean by religious
values, and I hope to do that, and define what we mean by economics.
Economics is no more than a division of moral philosophy. That's
how it began. That's what it is. It is trying to figure out how should we
organize our economic life in a way that we achieve the common good.
So that's the problem Smith set before himself.
We now have to define what we mean by the "common good."
Smith has his definition. He tends to use the word "prosperity" a lot, he
tends to use the word "peace" a lot, so he is actually willing sometimes
to make a trade-off between prosperity for national security. And he
always comes up with some reference to the working poor or the
marginalized or those who are left out of society. So that is his.24
I thought at this point this would be the ideal place where an
economist would try to insert religious values. Not being a great
theologian, I have to rely on the Ten Commandments.
I was taught - well, actually my kids were taught, they went
through it last year - so you've got the first three and you've got the
next seven. The first three tend to be very focused on items that you
have to be a man or a woman of faith to believe. The next seven seem to
be things that men and women of all goodwill can take on, so kind of the
liberal distinction there.
Well, okay, then we could take those last seven and then put that
into our definition of the common good, those things that all men and
women could agree on. But I think we are missing something when we
leave out the first three.
Now I am going to steal information from John Courtney Murray,
who used to be a Jesuit.
Father, are you always a Jesuit even after you die?
VOICE: You are.
PROF. SCHWALBENBERG: He is still a Jesuit up in heaven,
okay. I guess he was our leading moral theologian in the 2 0 th century.
24. See generally ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Random House
Modem Library 1937) (1776).
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The idea I am going to come up with is the dignity of the human
person. Those first three things, how you relate to your faith or your
god, for so many people are at the core of who they are. I think as a
society we want to defend what people feel is at their core.
There are three ways of going about this. One way, which we have
seen so many terrible examples of, is where they are wrong and we are
right, so we kill those who are the unbelievers. I think that is the
reaction that makes us try to go maybe the French way, where we say
this is irrelevant to the public dialogue and we just want to wipe it off
from the street.
And so what I like to suggest is the third way, which I think is John
Courtney Murray's, or at least my interpretation of him, which is the
dignity of the human person. If these things are so important to who we
are, then we have to defend people's rights to have them.
I remember a poor kid from college who I think did not get his job
with a nice corporation because he was an Orthodox Jew, and I suspect
that didn't go over well in his interview. That's all guesswork, but I
think those kinds of discriminations happen, and probably still happen.
And so what I would say is we still need some legal or regulatory
mechanism, or whatever, because we need to defend tolerance, which I
think is a great trait of the United States, as opposed to, say, the French
view. At the heart of tolerance is this idea of the dignity of the human
person.
But then we still have those other seven things - we don't steal,
we don't lie, we don't cheat - which are also very fundamental to
economists. Let me explain why.
So Smith back in 1776 is trying to figure out how to organize
society so we can achieve a just society. His answer is market,
competition. What he is really doing is taking the Western political
liberal tradition - I guess that's the 19th century and a little bit before
- and translating that into economics. So he is taking the concept of
liberty that the French and, I guess, some English political philosophers
had and bringing it into economic affairs, the normal work of the day,
earning a living.
He is saying what we want to do is allow people to have the most
freedom in this pursuit, and if we can break down power - and he was
trying to break down the King and the companies getting different
monopolies on different things - if we can break that up and make it a
competitive field, that will achieve prosperity. He even thinks it will
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increase he goes on and on. It solves all problems of the world.
I think mainstream economists still buy 80 percent, 90 percent, of
that. If you are out at the University of Chicago with Milton Friedman,
it is 100 percent. If you are here on the east coast, then it is maybe 80
percent.
And then what we throw into that mix is this thing of sometimes we
have markets that fail, market failures, and therefore an economist
comes to think that there is - I think we feel that there is no
inconsistency with religious values. Leave those bottom seven, the ones
that all men and women can agree on.
I personally think that maybe we should look at those first three to
see if those send something that we have to also defend in the public
domain. That gives us an objective as citizens - I think we are more
than consumers, we are citizens- and that can, at least in Smith's view,
drive the rationale for breaking up corporate power or monopolies and
having competition. And in those places where that market fails, then
there is a role for us as citizens to come together through the state to
regulate.
But the role of honesty, transparency - those of you who studied
economics know that markets will not be competitive and achieve the
social optimum unless there are all sorts of information flows. It has to
be an open, transparent society; otherwise we get all sorts of
breakdowns.
The last point before I close my mouth is I think there is some
tension between how economists took over the ideas of liberalism and
threw them in with Catholic moral or social thinking, in the sense that
we tend to see the person as an individual- that's the Western tradition
after the Enlightenment - where I think in many traditions - Catholic,
Confucian, whatever - the person is a social being. I haven't worked
out all the implications of that, but I think that ties in a lot with the
Professor's idea of reciprocity. That may be an area where the market
breaks down and giving individual incentives breaks down and you
really have to be more part of a common group.
I think we see that in the military all the time, right? The incentive
to carry out a mission is not that you are going to make a profit on this.
And usually when things are going bad, I'm staying here because my
buddy or my brother is next to me and I have to help him out.
And so sometimes that social being thing gets missed.
That's it.
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PROF. ZAMAGNI: Should we discuss?
Thank you very much, Henry, for your comments. Very, very
briefly, I totally agree that economics was born out of a moral
philosophy. That is very important and economists should never forget
about that.
Second, what you said in the middle of your remarks can perhaps
be restated in the following way. If we ask ourselves in which ways the
religious values, or even moral values, can be introduced into an
economic discourse, we can answer in two different ways. Either they
enter as constraint, as a constraint of the objective function, or they enter
as an argument of the objective function itself. That is, after all, what
makes the difference.
In other words, I could conceptualize a moral value as a constraint
- such as "don't do that," "be transparent," "don't cheat," etc., etc. -
or I can conceptualize this moral behavior as a preference, as an
argument of my preference function.
Now, what is the difference? The difference is that in the first case,
as soon as I realize that I could cheat, with the assumption that nobody
will pick up me, I will do it. But in the second case, that is not true.
In other words, the real point in my reading is that the real
challenge, which is first of all an intellectual challenge, is how to get to
the point where people understand that a virtuous life - and I use
"4virtuous" in the Aristotelian sense - is good not only for the others but
also for oneself. If we are able to show that behaving in a virtuous way
- honest, all the so-called moral values - not only do I do good things
for the other, but also for myself. That is the way in which, in my
opinion, we can get rid of what appeared recently.
Everybody knows about Enron, for instance. Enron published their
Social Report. Go and read the initial statement of the Social Report of
Enron published in the year 2000. I have the quote here somewhere,
where they said, "We will behave this way, we will never cheat, we will
never" - and so on. That was written. And still everybody knows what
happened.
Why is that so? Because at a certain moment the management
believed that it was possible for them not to follow what they stated
without paying a penalty. Of course they did a mistake.
So that is why it is proper, for instance, to go in the other direction.
Finally, your remarks about Smith, I totally agree.
Marx said: how to organize society? Market, exactly. But market
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presupposes division of labor, and the division of labor presupposes the
organization. In other words, you cannot have a market unless you have
organizations which can work according to a principle of organization.
That is the point I wanted to raise.
It is not enough to say in the market there is competition. Of course
market economy means competition. But you can do competition in
many different ways. In other words, only if one subscribes to a
deterministic approach, in the neo-positivistic sense - you can say "to
compete you have to follow the one best way" - but there is no one
best way as far as the organization of firms, of corporations, is
concerned. That is perhaps the most important point.
And it is also the challenge, to find a way to apply reciprocity,
which is a principle and also a culture, also inside the corporation,
because if I talk about reciprocity within the family or within a non-
profit organization, it is obvious. Everybody understands that within the
family the relationship between father and mother, sisters and brothers,
are relatively based on the principle of reciprocity and not on the
exchange of equivalents like the market.
But the real challenge is to prove concretely that it is possible to run
a firm which competes in the market and whose internal organization is
based on the principle of reciprocity. In my opinion, that is the real
challenge. Perhaps today in the afternoon we will listen to, as I read
here from the program, some testimony of experience in that regard.
But I have found that that is the real challenge in particular for the
economists.
I conclude by saying that we economists are sometimes too much
obsolete, because we tend to cope with the new problems of the
globalization epoch - and there are so many - by using the same
categorical apparatus which was good for this type of society which is
over.
QUESTION [Prof. Luigino Bruni, Professor, Department of
Economics, University of Milan-Biococca]: May I ask a question of
Professor Zamagni? Can you please say something more about
reciprocity in two directions? First, my understanding of reciprocity is
that reciprocity usually is not stable, is not a matched equilibrium. It is
difficult to remain in a reciprocal situation.
The second is: which is the difference really between reciprocity
and the exchange of equivalents? Because also in reciprocity there is a
sort of bi-direction, there are two people - or maybe not two, maybe
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three perhaps - then that is no altruism but there is something different.
In two words, if you can say why it is no stable reciprocity in
organizations, and second, the difference between reciprocity and
market exchange, given that both are two or three parts doing something
together?
PROF. ZAMAGNI: Perhaps we can collect other questions.
QUESTION: I have just a couple of comments.
One, I think I would like to congratulate Professor Schwalbenberg
on his last statement, that the key, I think, is the difference between
viewing the individual as an individual or viewing them as a person. I
think almost all the mistakes that economists make start there, and I
would encourage him to think about that and pursue that line.
I did want to make one little statement on our friend Adam Smith. I
think you got the proportions a little wrong. I think economists accept
40 percent of Smith in Chicago, they accept 50 percent, but what they do
not accept is the theory of moral sentiments, the other half. In the theory
of moral sentiments, Smith gives an analysis of how we come to act in a
moral way, and that moral individual is required for us to then allow
these people into the marketplace and act in a self-interested way
because they are controlling the abuses.
Chesterton tells us that self-government starts with governing
ourselves.25 Well, free exchange in a market requires that we control
and limit ourselves, that we do not act in a way that our interest is at the
expense of someone else's interest, but that somehow there is a mutual
interest and a mutual benefit that is arrived at.
If we can only get economists - well, it would be nice if we could
get them to read The Wealth of Nations, but if we can get them to read
The Theory of Moral Sentiments first, I think we would make a lot of
progress in this area.
PROF. ZAMAGNI: Thank you.
QUESTION: Professor Zamagni, I very much agree with your
statement that modeling the interaction in a firm as an agency problem
and then just looking at incentive structures is a very impoverished way
of thinking about intra-firm relations for a number of reasons.
But I wonder whether the mainstream economist crowd might not
quibble with your statement that the mechanism of price competition
25. The exact quotation is that "[s]elf-denial is the test and definition of self-
government," available at http://www.chesterton.org/discover/quotations.html.
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only works in markets. I am thinking here of Gary Becker's Theory of
the Family,26 where he models the interactions within a firm as market
interactions and takes something like preferences to replace money, so
it's not a monetized market, but it is nevertheless something that can be
modeled as a market.
I wonder whether it is not a category mistake, rather it is just a
decision theoretic choice about how to make the model. I do not think it
is necessarily a category mistake, although I do tend to agree very much
with you that it is an impoverished way of viewing the interactions
within a firm.
PROF. ZAMAGNI: Thank you. Thank you very much.
The question raised by Professor Bruni is partly connected to your
second question, so I will answer them jointly.
First of all, on this reciprocity issue, there is a growing literature.
In the last ten years or so, or even less, the major journals in economics
devote increasing attention, in particular because the empirical research
- or better to say, I correct myself - experimental economics on the
lines of Harris, Fehr, and many other people have given evidence that in
actuality we human beings practice reciprocity.
If you ask people to play an ultimatum game, you notice that most
of the time they would give you an answer which shows that people
have sort of an inborn attitude towards reciprocity. And so, even from
the experimental side, there is new evidence.
But the basic question was: what is the difference between the
principle of reciprocity and the principle of exchange of equivalents?
The basic difference can be said like this.
First of all, it has to do with the distinction between an individual
and a person. Under individualism, the individual will always be able to
practice exchange of equivalents - "I give you this and you give me in
exchange the price," the equivalent in value, which is called the price.
On the other hand, reciprocity postulates the recognition of the intimate
relationality of the person; a person is an individual in relation with
others, if you want to give the most emphatic definition of a person.
Now, the problem is that in the exchange of equivalents the two
relations are - one is conditioned by the other. In other words, the
second relation is dependent on the first one. If I give you the pen and if
26. Gary Becker, Gary Becker's Theory of the Family: Some Interdisciplinary
Considerations, 66 Soc. & SOC. RES., No. 1 (1981).
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you do not pay me the price, I can bring you to the court, or to the
lawyer, according to the case, which means that you are paying, it is not
free; it is conditioned on my initial giving to you.
The second difference is that in the exchange of equivalents the
determination of the equilibrium price is a priori, comes before the
exchanges of property rights. First of all, we have to agree on the terms
of trade. Once we have found an agreement, which we economists call
equilibrium, then we have the transfer of property rights. In the
reciprocity, that is not the case because you have A moves towards B on
the basis, for instance, of the gift principle, and it does so under the
conjecture that B will reciprocate - the conjecture, which means that B
is not compelled to reciprocate, it is only expected to reciprocate.
The third difference is that in the reciprocity relationship, B not
necessarily has to reciprocate towards A, but could do that towards
another person that we call C or D, etc. In other words, to generalize,
the difference is the following: the reciprocity principle is nothing but
the actual incarnation of the principle of fraternity. In other words, the
principle of fraternity, if you want to translate that principle, which is
philosophical, legal, etc., into economic terms, you get to the reciprocity
principle.
That is why in these days there is a new interest towards the
reciprocity, because people have discovered that freedom and equality
- libert , igaliti, fratdrnit, these were the three words of the French
Revolution. As you know, after the French Revolution, the third word,
ftatdrnit, was canceled. Saint-Just, when he became Minister after the
French Revolution, passed a decree whereby he abolished thefratdrnit'
principle. Now, there is no time to go into that, but it is fascinating to
try to understand why that was so.
In fact, after the French Revolution, we kept on, in particular in
liberal political theory, to talk about liberty and equality, which is okay,
but the word fraternity was canceled, disappeared.
Now it is coming back again. Why is that so? Because we are
discovering there are many problems in our societies, economic and
social, which cannot be solved within only liberty and equality. We
needed to get back to the fraternity principle, because the fraternity
principle existed much before the French Revolution, and that is why the
revolutionaries in France used as a banner also the fraternity principle.
Now, if you want to translate fraternity into economic jargon, you
get the reciprocity principle. That is interesting to show. We have now
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produced models in economic theory showing how market competition
operates in the market for corporations or firms which are based as far as
their internal organization is concerned on the fraternity principle or
reciprocity principle and firms or corporations which are based as far as
their internal organization is concerned on the principle of exchange of
equivalents.
Now, what we can show theoretically by using models is that in the
long run the first type or first category of enterprises are more efficient
and more sustainable than the other. You have to use a theory of
evolutionary gains, as we do in economics. By using a theory of
evolutionary gains, you show that in the long run those firms whose
working is based on the principle of reciprocity are stronger than the
other ones. That is something on which we have to work, etc.
It seems to me that that is a proper way to have religious values or
moral values entering into a discipline like economics, because in
economics you cannot use the jargon of religious values in the usual
sense, because that is moralistic or paternalistic, and people will say,
"Oh, we do not care about that." You have to show that a value, such as
fraternity, has implications in economics, not instrumental, but because
they enter, as I said before, as an argument of the preference function.
Finally, the third question, I thank you, because of course I am not
doing good justice to your remark, because it is very important. You
referred to Becker.
Now, where is the difference? The difference is that the Beckerian
approach - Coase, etc. - all that approach is based on an assumption
which very seldom is made explicit. The assumption is the following:
that economic agents enter the market scene with preferences which are
default. That is the trick. As a professor, I always teach that to the
students, to open their eyes, because that in my opinion is not
intellectually honest, not to explicitly say like that.
Now, Becker is honest because he writes that, but most people, just
for laziness, they say that that approach is based on that strategic
assumption, that when we operate in the market we assume that the
economic agents enter the market already with a preference. But that is
not true. There is no need to be a psychologist to understand that it is
not true, because we get that information.
In other words, when we enter the market, the market forms our
cultural traits as well as the internal corporations, the organization of
corporations, they form it only. If it is true, as it is true, that we spend
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most of our time inside an organization, how can we possibly believe
that the organization at the top of the firm does not modify our frame of
mind?
So if we work in an organization where the only rule is to practice
free-riding, to do shirking, to cheat, or to do dirty things, mobbing, etc.,
it is obvious that after awhile, since I spend most of my life in that
organization, I will become like that.
But for Becker and many other economists, preferences are
exogenously given, and then it is intolerable, because that factually is
not true, because while we work, while we operate, in the market game,
we change our frame of mind, so you have a sort of a co-evolution. We
enter the market with certain preferences, but the market modifies our
preferences.
So that is why in my opinion it is proper to make this consideration
explicit. Then everybody is left free to choose their way. But at least
we have to acknowledge that.
Thank you.
PANEL TWO: MANAGING AS IF FAITH MATTERS1
MODERATOR:
Michael Naughton
Professor, University of St. Thomas
Director of the John A. Ryan Institute for Catholic Social Thought
PANELISTS:
Joseph E. Geoghan, Esq.
Retired Vice-President and General Counsel, and
Member of the Board of Directors,
Union Carbide Corporation
Talat Ansari, Esq.
Partner, Kelley, Drye & Warren, LLP
Charles MA. Clark
Senior Fellow, Vincentian Center for Church and Society, and
Professor of Economics, Tobin College of Business,
St. John's University
MS. UELMEN: I think we are just about ready to get started with
the 11:30 panel. We have "Managing as if Faith Matters." We stole the
title from a book by Michael Naughton, who is our moderator. I am
very grateful that he has traveled to be here with us.
Then we have Joe Geoghan, who is the Retired General Counsel of
Union Carbide; Talat Ansari, who is a Partner at Kelley, Drye &
Warren; and Charles Clark, who is at St. John's Business School. We
1 The title of this panel is taken from Helen Alford and Michael Naughton's book
MANAGING AS IF FAITH MATTERED: CHRISTIAN SOCIAL PRINCIPLES IN THE
MODERN ORGANIZATION (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 2001). "
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are very delighted to have this wonderful panel assembled.
There is also more background on each of the speakers in your
materials. They have extensive biographies.
We will turn it over to Michael for "Managing as if Faith Matters."
I think you all know about the hypothetical that is also in your materials.
PROF. NAUGHTON: Thank you, Amy.
While the title of our session comes from our book, we stole the
title from another title of a book by E.F. Schumacher, a book called
Small Is Beautiful.2 The subtitle of that book is "Economics as if People
Mattered." Schumacher's assumption is that the economic profession
was going astray and that economics itself had to be redirected toward
its primary object, which is the health and development of people.3
In a very similar way, what we want to do in this session is to
explore together what corporate board decisions could look like, as if
faith mattered. But in a very similar way, like Schumacher, we also
come to the reality that often sometimes, we ourselves do not act or do
not manage or do not work as if faith mattered.
But of course the reason why we are here is that we also believe -
and I think there are great signs in our culture that point this way - that
people want to be faithful, because they want a greater depth of
integration between their faith and work.
If I can just give you one quote from a poet, David Whyte, who
speaks about this question of this integration, this reconnection, between
faith and one's work, he says: "Whatever strategy we employ, or
whoever we choose to speak with, we are eventually compelled to bring
our work life into the realm of spiritual examination. We simply spend
too much time and have too much psychic and emotional energy
invested in the workplace for us to declare it a spiritual desert, bereft of
life-giving water."4
And yet, if we are to engage these religious values, religious
traditions, we of course cannot neglect the technical, the financial, the
legal, and the various dimensions that modern corporations have to exist
in.
The challenge for people of faith, of course, is to engage these
2. E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL Is BEAUTIFUL (Perennial 1989).
3. Id.
4. DAVID WHYTE, THE HEART AROUSED: POETRY AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE
SOUL (Currency 1996).
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technical dimensions within their particular theological religious
tradition. This is no doubt a complex and difficult undertaking, but I
think most of us realize it can reap great rewards, not only for one's own
deep personal meaning in life, which we all seek, but also for a more just
workplace and a better culture.
This morning we are very fortunate to have with us together three
men who can help us both understand the complexities and bring their
unique faith tradition to bear on the problem of outsourcing. What we
plan to do this morning is to examine a particular case about a board of
directors that has to make a decision whether to move operations from
the U.S. to India. The question before the Board is whether to go or not
to go.
Now, of course, as with all cases, we do not have all the facts, and
we are just simply going to have to face that reality. But the focus that
we want is: What do religious values specifically have to do when facing
this particular case?
We will first hear from Joe Geoghan and Talat Ansari, who have
both experience and general counsel on various multinational boards.
They have been there. They have had to deal with the difficulties of the
situation. They are both men of faith. I think they will have great
insight for us. We also will hear after that from Charlie Clark, who is an
economist, has done a lot of work in the area of labor, and who will
approach this from a labor perspective, particularly within the broad
Judeo-Christian tradition. Each person will have about five-to-seven
minutes, and after their presentations, they will provide a one-minute
response to each other. We will then open up the floor to the larger
audience.
Joe, would you begin?
MR. GEOGHAN: Thank you, Mike.
Let me begin by reaffirming that, first, I am not an academic, I am a
lawyer and I was a businessman. I was a business executive with Union
Carbide Corporation and I was on the Board of Directors of Union
Carbide Corporation for the last nine years of my career. I spent my
entire career with them, forty years.
Not being an academic, I have not read some of the sources that
were referred to, for example, earlier by Dean Sargent, but I do know
corporate culture, I know it very well. I am familiar with the way other
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companies operate. I am familiar certainly with the way my own
company operated.
I have to tell you that I really hesitate to draw the kinds of
conclusions that were drawn this morning from the misdeeds of a few. I
think that, by and large, the corporate culture that exists in America is
one with integrity. I think that the managers at the top level of the
corporation, the inside management as well as the Board, are by and
large people who are honest, capable, and have integrity.
Amy referred a little earlier to a little colloquium that she and I had
about fraud and the impact on fraud of religious values. My take on that
is that it has no impact. People who commit fraud are crooks.
I think the point is borne out when one looks at the background of a
Kozlowski and one looks at the background of the person at the head of
Parmalat, who was reputedly a devout Catholic. I must say, because I
am a lawyer, parenthetically, that Mr. Kozlowski has not been
convicted, nor has the CEO of Parmalat been convicted of anything, so I
use those in a very loose way, and I would predicate my remarks by
saying that they are alleged to have done misdeeds.
But these people allegedly decided to do something that was wrong.
They allegedly knew it was wrong. They had religious values that told
them it was wrong. They nevertheless decided to do it. It is the attitude
of a typical criminal. It should not in any way, in my judgment, be
applied as a generality to the entire corporate community.
Undeniably, there may be people in corporations, as in every
population, who are not good people. In addition, young people at the
bottom of the corporate ladder are likely to be very aggressive. They
compete aggressively, they know they have to perform in order to earn
their stripes and advance within the corporation, and they work very
hard at it. Internal educational programs on corporate ethics are very
important at this point. As people move up the ladder, gaining age,
wisdom and maturity, this aggressiveness begins to be tempered much
more by corporate reality, by a more highly developed sense of ethics
born of experience and born of their own personal insights.
I would also note that most of the boards of these companies that
have been targeted for prosecution have not been prosecuted criminally.
They have some serious problems with civil law and their own personal
fortunes, but they have not been prosecuted criminally. My reading of
newspaper accounts of the position of many of these board members is
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that they were apathetic in some cases, not capable of understanding the
situations in others, and there was undoubtedly - and this continues to
be a problem - cronyism. CEOs like to have other CEOs on their
board. When a director does not understand a complex problem, in the
context of cronyism there is more likelihood that he or she will tilt to
management's side and just accept management's judgment of what is
happening.
But the point is that what I see from my experience, the product of
forty years in the corporate world, is that most people try to do the right
thing, and particularly they try to do the right thing at the more senior
levels.
Now I am going to move into the case of whether Americana, the
corporation involved, will move its manufacturing operations to India.
In order to put this in the right context, I need to sort of walk through my
own formulation of how the law applies and how people at the very
senior levels of the corporation, on the board, will look at this issue.
First, I subscribe to the traditional formulation of the responsibility
of corporate directors. Basically, this requires that they act loyally, with
due care, in good faith, and in the honest belief that they are acting in the
best interest of the corporation and its stockholders. The Board must
also have a coherent economic rationale dedicated to the best interest of
stockholders and in the context of good-faith entrepreneurial risk-taking.
Now, I have used the term "best interest." Many others use
"shareholder maximization" or "wealth maximization." Most of the
commentators do use "best interest" I think, and there is considerable
difference between the terms. I do know that "wealth maximization"
has been used in the context particularly of takeover litigation, but I
personally am more comfortable, and I think most people in the
corporate world are more comfortable, with "best interest of the
corporation" and "best interest of the shareholders." I think it gives one
a much broader perspective within which to manage a corporation.
Query: Does the criterion of best interest of the corporation and its
shareholders permit a corporation to consider the impact, as in our case,
on its employees? I have always felt it did. There was quite a bit of
litigation on this.
I have just been notified that I have two minutes. I spent too much
time talking about the earlier debate at the first panel, so I am going to
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run through a little bit of this.
In many states, as one of the people noted on the other panel,
stakeholder legislation has been adopted. This clarifies, I think to
everyone's satisfaction, that in every instance in those states, particularly
New York, you may consider the interests of employees and other
stakeholders in deciding any corporate action.
In my experience, the directors of every reputable corporation
operate on a guiding principle that the best interests of the corporation
are served by ensuring the corporation behaves ethically. I think that
this was a point also made by Professor Zamagni. Ethical norms require
the Corporation to act with justness and fairness in relations with the
corporation's employees.
In fact, I note that this same point is made by Pope John Paul in his
prophetic Encyclical Centesimus Annus, in which he says that "the
negative actions against employees are morally inadmissible, but in
addition will eventually have a negative repercussion on the firm's
economic efficiency."5 How true it is. And I think most corporations
adopt that.
Moving to our case study, what norms and standards of justice does
a director apply when the Board is comprised of people with different or
no religious traditions? I believe that each director must answer that
question by first examining any generally accepted norms that may be
applicable, and then overlaying that with the norms and standards that
form a part of that person's inner self or conscience. These norms may
be acquired from a religious tradition or from secular human standards.
I do not believe that there should be a faith-based qualification for
service as a director, nor do I believe that the Board should adopt any
religious tradition as a guide. However, I strongly believe in the maxim
that there is no wall of separation whatsoever between the principles that
I apply in my personal life as a Roman Catholic and those applied in my
business career. The norms and standards of conduct that I would apply
to Americana's case would be influenced by the social justice teaching
of the Church, beginning with the longstanding principle of the primacy
of labor over capital, and then proceeding through perhaps another
5. See Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus (1991). Centesimus Annus was
promulgated in 1991, on the hundredth anniversary of the first social encyclical, Rerum
Novarum.
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review of Centesimus Annus. 6
I would note, seeing as this involves a move to India of the
manufacturing function, there was one reference that I came across in
rereading that Encyclical that I thought was interesting. In discussing
charitable giving, the Pope points out, referencing it to a corporation,
that "the decision to invest in one place rather than another, or in one
productive sector rather than another, is always a moral and cultural
choice."7 That is an issue or point that I would fully subscribe to.
So one conclusion that I draw from a review of social justice
principles of the Church is that there is at least a moral and ethical
equivalence between investment in a manufacturing facility in the
Midwest of the United States and investing in one in southern India, and
perhaps even a tilt toward investment in India.
In this case, assuming that we can verify that the wages - you will
see there is a little fillip in this case about wages in India - that these
wages are not exploitative and assuming that we can build in very
strong, well-thought-out compensation plans for the people of
Americana who will be displaced by this move, who will lose their jobs,
as a director of Americana, I would vote in one of two ways. I would
either to vote to move the facility or move the manufacturing operation
to India, premised on the obligation of acting in the best interests of
stockholders while considering the interests of the employees and other
stakeholders.
PROF. NAUGHTON: Thank you, Joe.
Talat, please.
MR. ANSARI: I basically agree with what Joe has said about a duty
of a director. Having served on several boards and having practiced law
for about thirty years, both here as well as internationally, I think
directors owe a duty of care and loyalty, to act in the best interest of the
corporation, and that is the primary duty of a director. So as we come
with this hypothetical situation, I come to this hypothetical meeting with
the clear idea of acting in the best interest of the corporation.
The problem that I have in facing this case study is that, in addition
to being a director, I am also a human being who believes in faith. I
6. See id.
7. Id.
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follow the faith of Islam. So what does Islam teach about how to deal
with business and how to deal with issues of ethics as and when they
arise?
There are some very, very basic ethical issues which are more
human and universal issues which Islam applies to all its day-to-day
functioning, which include truthfulness, trust, sincerity, equality of
person, and justice. But in addition to that, unlike most of the great
religions in the world, Islam was brought to this world by a person who
before achieving his status as a prophet was also a trader, he was a
businessman. So Islam contains, in addition to the universal ethical
norms, certain norms of business as well, which have to be kept in mind
and followed when any believer is supposed to be indulging in business.
These are some basic issues which have been adopted universally.
For example, one of the fundamental Islamic business ethics is
adherence to contracts. It is important that you fulfill your contract once
you have promised someone that you will perform a certain thing.
In addition, there is a prohibition against false advertising and
misrepresentation. There is a requirement to give accurate measurement
and weight and value for goods or service that you are providing. There
are prohibitions against hoarding and profiteering. And, last but not the
least, there is a requirement of fair treatment of workers.
How do I apply this to the current situation if I adopt my
background and advise the Board on how to proceed? Being of Indian
origin, I should be delighted that this is going back to India. But that is
not the case, because in this situation, in addition to the moving and
profit achievement of Americana, about 900 people are going to lose
their jobs.
So I would recommend to the Board, both because I believe that the
duty of care that is required of a director is the best interest of the
corporation as a whole, which includes not merely the shareholders but
also the management, the workers, and the customers, and that duty of
best interest should be to all of these ingredients of a corporate entity.
In order to do that, I would request the Board to consider how to
best reduce the suffering or the firing of the 900 people that we are
going to sever. Perhaps a better severance package may be considered
by the Board. Perhaps additional training so that they could find jobs
and continue their livelihood.
What also bothers me is that the government of Bompour, the
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artificial state government in this case study, has for some reason
refused to allow Americana to pay higher wages to the locals who will
be working there. I would like the Board to consider recommending to
the person handling the matter possibly going back to that institution,
that state government, and asking them to reconsider a better wage rate
for these employees.
PROF. NAUGHTON: Very good. Thank you very much, Talat.
Charlie?
PROF. CLARK: First, I would like to say that it is great to be back
at Fordham. As a Fordham graduate from the College at Lincoln Center
in 1982, Fordham is where I first read Thorstein Veblen and Leo XIII,
and all my thinking since has been formed by both of them, so it is
always great to be back here at Fordham.
We have to suspend reality here a little to accept the possibility that
I would be put on a Board of Directors. I was brought to this panel to
give a labor perspective; maybe to stir things up a bit, that is why they
put me on the extreme left here. I will try to fulfill that role.
Michael likes to invite me to these types of forums because I make
him look like a moderate, so I will do that as well.
My comments will be informed by the Catholic tradition of
addressing social issues or economic issues, and that of course is
Catholic social thought. Now, Catholic social thought is just common
sense applied to the pursuit of happiness. All the principles of Catholic
social thought can be accepted and argued without any recourse to
revealed truths, except for one, and that is the first principle: the inherent
dignity of the human individual. You cannot prove that. You either
accept it as a matter of faith or you do not.
Now, secular humanists, who tend to have more faith than religious
people, but not as much as atheists, they would accept that, and most
religious traditions would accept it, even if they did not go back to
Genesis, to the fact that we were created by God with reason and
intelligence.
And even though we find many examples of deviations from reason
and intelligence, reason and free will, it is still the inherent
characteristics of the human person upon which all social analysis
should start and should proceed from to the next principles.
So what I am going to do is just look at some of the principles in
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Catholic social thought which I think would enlighten our conversation
on this issue and give us some insight in terms of how we should make
our decisions.
The first is that human happiness requires participation.8 It is
through participation with others as persons that we grow as individuals,
as we achieve our happiness in giving ourselves in a loving manner to
others, as John Paul has written extensively in his philosophical
writings, both before his pontificate and in many of his Encyclicals after.
Now, an essential aspect of participation is economic participation
and playing a role in the decisions that will affect your economic life. In
the real world in a case like this, labor would not have a voice, would
not have a vote, and would be excluded from participating in the
decision which will impact them more than everyone else.
The worst-case scenario to the stockholders in the case we are
considering here is that they get a lower rate of return on their money -
there is no real risk here for them. The worst-case scenario for the
workers is, of course, that they lose their houses, they lose their jobs,
they are not able to support their families; the alcoholism rate and
suicide rate will go up - all the horrible things that happened in
Pittsburgh when they closed down the steel mills, in Youngstown, all
over - all these things will happen; the risk here for the workers is
much higher.
So in terms of the principle of participation, it is essential that the
people who are most involved in this decision, most affected, should be
the ones making it, and in this scenario they would be excluded.
The second principle, which needs to be mentioned, and which has
been mentioned before, is the priority of labor over capital. 9 That is,
tools in any economy are to serve the workers, tools serve people, and
not the reverse. But it also means money (in the form of financial
capital) serves people. People do not serve money - that is idolatry -
but money is to serve people.
Now, in today's economy capital is also knowledge. What this
corporation would be doing is moving not the real physical capital over
to India, but the legal rights and the knowledge over to India. But again,
it has to serve the people, not the other way around. So that should enter
8. See THOMAS MASSARO, LIVING JUSTICE 121 (Sheed & Ward 2000).
9. CHARLES E. CURRAN, CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 1891-PRESENT, 13, 78-80,
90, 204-5 (Georgetown Univ. Press 2002).
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into the discussion.
A third principle in Catholic social thought is that wealth should be
created in a moral way and it should not be created in an exploitive
way.' o In economics, we talk about wealth creation as if it is a good in
and of itself, and of course it is not a good in and of itself. The human
person is a good in and of itself. Creating wealth is only good if it
serves that purpose, which means that it is created in a way that serves
the human person and that it is used in a way that serves the human
person, and it can never be that wealth is created as a good in and of
itself.
Now, one bad way you can create wealth is to shift your costs on to
someone else. So the owners of the capital shift the cost over to the
workers by not paying them a just wage or a living wage, on to the
community by not producing in a way that does not pollute the
environment. In this case, in order not to get a small decrease in their
rate of return, they are going to shift the costs over to India where they
can pay much lower wages, not have to worry about safe working
conditions, not have to worry about the community, have the
government give them sweetheart deals so that they probably do not
have to pay for the land, which most likely will be taken from the people
who live there and given to the corporation either freely or at a very low
rate. All these efforts in order to transfer some of the benefits of this
wealth creation to an even smaller number of people.
Now, this is bad wealth creation. We can find numerous reasons in
the Old and New Testaments as to why this is bad. The Bible clearly
states that creating wealth at the expense of the poor is a grave evil.
A fourth principle is that private property is social." Lawyers will
tell you private property is based on the law. Economists will tell you
private property has to be absolute so that the owners of the property can
use it in the most efficient manner, which means whatever gets the most
profit or rate of return to the owners of the property.
But we restrict property all the time. Why? Because we know that
markets are not perfectly efficient, that there are externalities all over the
place, that there are merit goods and higher responsibilities. I cannot
10. Id. at 173-213.
11. Id. at 173-81.
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take out a cigarette and smoke it; that is there are restrictions on how I
can use my private property in New York City. We restrict private
property. Why? Because it is inherently social.
In terms of the corporation's property in the case we are discussing,
part of the value of that property is because of the time, talent, and
efforts that the workers have put into building up this corporation. They
have invested considerable equity in this company, and yet it does not
count for anything. But if we recognize the social basis for property, we
would take that into consideration.
The decision by this company is legal, but in no way can we say
that it is moral. I think we could also argue that it is only economically
efficient if we define economic efficiency in terms of a small group's
interest in ways that do not account for all the costs and benefits that this
action will take.
Thank you.
PROF. NAUGHTON: Thank you.
Well, we certainly have a spectrum of ideas on the table here. A
one-minute response by each.
Joe, could you begin?
MR. GEOGHAN: It is a little difficult in one minute, but I will try
Mike.
PROF. NAUGHTON: Okay, two.
MR. GEOGHAN: I think that Professor Clark's analysis to some
extent denigrates the role of the people in India who would benefit from
moving the investment to that country. As I said in my own remarks, I
think, again based on my own reading of Catholic social justice
principles, there is at least a moral equivalence to locating a
manufacturing facility in the Midwest or to locating one in India, and
perhaps a tilt to India because of the greater effect, more profound
effect, that locating such a facility would have there.
Insofar as getting an inside track on government things, I think that
is a bit of a 19 th century ideal, quite honestly, from the British Empire.
That one can get those kinds of deals in India today - in my
experience, and working with my friend here to my left for so many
years - the people in India are very, very hard negotiators.
It is a very difficult situation with the employees of the United
States who will be displaced by this and who will lose their jobs. The
only way that it can be addressed is with compensation. I totally share
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that view. I think the compensation has to be significant enough to
ensure that there is a way to move on with their lives and undertake,
hopefully, additional job opportunities.
Hopefully, these employees', long-term employees' in particular,
interest in the equity of Americana - assuming most of them have been
in 401(k) plans that have fared better than Enron's did - will benefit by
increasing the profitability of the company and thereby increasing the
stock price of the company.
As to Talat's views, he and I are, I think, in complete agreement,
and I too would recommend that the Board direct management to go
back and argue with the authorities in India with respect to the wages to
be paid to the new operation there.
PROF. NAUGHTON: Talat?
MR. ANSARI: Charlie rightly said that he was on the far left. I
think the only comment I have about Charlie's analysis of the case that
we have today is that the hypothetical corporation, Americana, Inc., is
faced with a severe competitive problem. It has two extremely low-cost
manufacturers from Asia who are competing in the market, its stock
price has already eroded 50 percent. If it is not able to compete at the
pricing, the reality of the economic situation would be that the company
may have to file for bankruptcy, wind up, or shutdown. What happens
to the employees in that situation?
I think the ability of the corporation to give a decent severance
package together with a possibility, if at all, to train them for future jobs
may probably have a better impact on the labor force than just
continuing a corporation which does not seem to have any substantive
future in this area.
PROF. NAUGHTON: Thank you.
Charlie?
PROF. CLARK: We are given a choice between two options, but
there are more than two options. If the employees were part of the
decision-making process the whole time, then they would most likely be
making decisions that would make sure that the company is more
competitive because it is in their interest and they are able to participate
and make those decisions. If the company goes bankrupt based on their
decisions, well at least they have made the decisions and it will be their
responsibility and not someone else's.
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I do have to respond to this idea of a moral equivalence. There is
no moral equivalence to taking one person's job away that they already
have and then giving it to another person. If you are thinking about
investing something that does not exist, then you might be able to pursue
that argument, although I strongly doubt there is any altruism in any of
this decision. It is made solely so that a few people can get a little
richer, not because they want to help the people in India.
But this is something that already exists. These people have these
jobs. Having these jobs should give them certain rights. It is like saying
that there would be no moral equivalence if you lived in your house or if
I took someone else and put them in your house. Well no, because you
are already there. I would love to find anything in not only the Catholic
social thought tradition but in religious tradition that suggests that we
should take food out of the mouth of someone and make them hungry in
order to give it to someone else.
It also presupposes that the people in India do not have a traditional
economy, are not doing things right now, which again we cannot
assume; that is not in the case. They are obviously subsisting as it is
now because they are still alive, they have a university, and you want to
go there and use their labor. You want to direct it to something that you
can profit from instead of what it is being used for right now. So I
would say there is no moral equivalence there.
PROF. NAUGHTON: Well, I think our panelists could keep going
at this one. But let's turn this over to you and get out some other issues,
or feel free to comment on what has already been spoken about.
QUESTION: In support of Professor Clark, I think the facts
indicate that the company could probably survive, would not go into
bankruptcy, even despite this competition. At least that is what the facts
say.
But I think, obviously, if the company would go out of business,
then you save 300 workers by transferring the 900 jobs to India. You
save at least the other 300 jobs. Otherwise you lose them all.
I would just mention that most faiths that I am familiar with have
some system of preferences. So I am not sure - I do not know enough
about the Catholic approach of the moral equivalency. But I know that
in Judaism, for example, you do charity. In charity, first one gives to his
family, then his community and then to his city. So to a certain extent
from a Jewish perspective there would be a concern about who gets
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preference as to these jobs.
But in the global economy, with the person who is in charge, here a
Muslim sheikh, I am not sure what his priority is and what each of the
priorities of the people on the Board would be. And again from a Jewish
perspective, there is a strong argument that you have to train these
people if you do sever their jobs. There is a difference in Judaism
between taking- you are not taking away a job.
You have to fulfill your contractual commitment with these
employees. If you have a negotiated collective bargaining agreement,
you have got to live up to the collective bargaining agreement. But they
have no more than that. In other words, what they have they have. You
are not at the end of the contractual terms transferring jobs to other
people; you are not taking away that which these employees have. You
do nonetheless have an important moral responsibility from a Jewish
perspective to train them and give severance pay.
And indeed, in this case under these facts, if the local government
in this fictional place will not let you increase the wages to the local
Indian employees, you can use that extra money to help train and
provide severance pay to the existing employees.
PROF. NAUGHTON: Who would like to respond to that? Charlie.
PROF. CLARK: A quick response. Thomas Aquinas has written
about charity and these sorts of issues. He says you have to feed
yourself and those you are most immediately responsible for, for the
obvious reason that you will be no good in the future if you do not take
care of that.'2 But meeting other claims from the poor and from others
comes from your surplus, not from your basic subsistence. 3
PROF. NAUGHTON: Joe?
MR. GEOGHAN: I think I generally agree with the gentleman's
comments.
I would make just one observation on the equivalence issue. There
is clearly, clearly an obligation to the U.S. employees. My contention is
that that obligation does not require one to maintain the existence of a
job when the rights of the owners of the business will be impaired by
that, but it does require significant compensation to offset the loss of a
12. Id. at 176-77.
13. Id. at 193.
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job. What that is we could debate for a long time, but it is significant. I
want to also note that I do not use the word "generous" compensation
because I think it is an obligation to pay significant compensation to
offset the job loss.
QUESTION [Amy Uelmen]: I just had one question. Professor
Clark talked about the idea of participation as being key. I wonder if
there is another element coming from the other side, of participation on
the part of future Indian employees, and in particular if Catholic social
thought would not have something to say about American-run
corporations operating in other countries. Additionally, the extent to
which there is a concern about the participation of the employees and
kind of being nested into the culture, whether there wouldn't be a
concern from the other direction, and whether that wouldn't weigh in
this decision as well.
MR. GEOGHAN: Amy, do I understand that you are concerned
about the culture of the Indian employees, that there is some kind of
acculturation process underway with the Americans? Is that the point?
QUESTIONER [Amy Uelmen]: Yes, the extent to which an
American-run operation would leave enough room for a robust sense of
participation on the part of the Indian employees.
MR. GEOGHAN: I do not know that an organization operating in
India would operate much differently than it does in the United States in
terms of participation by employees. There may or may not be a trade
union. There are employee committees of one sort or another.
But I think that the culture that exists in India is essentially
unaffected by the nationality of the employer. In our experience, the
company I was with operated a huge subsidiary in India for fifty or
eighty years with 11,000 employees. It was wholly Indian from the top
management on down to the people who emptied the wastepaper baskets
in the evening. That company encountered a terrible tragedy. But
nevertheless, prior to that, the company was one of the gold stars of
India.
So I think the system works. Exactly how one applies principles of
participation by employees in a given environment depends on the
culture and it depends on the laws of the country. But, in general, I do
not think the employees that work for American subsidiaries suffer at all
by moving their allegiance, if they do move their allegiance, from an
Indian employer.
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Do you want to comment on that?
MR. ANSARI: Yes.
Amy, my response to that is two-fold. One is that the Indian
economy is currently very global. All kinds of corporations are
functioning out of there.
Secondly, the Indian corporate governance norms have now
provided - and that may not apply to Americana because Americana is
not traded on an Indian stock exchange - but if Americana was traded
on an Indian stock exchange, the Indian corporate governance will
require them to have a representative of employees on its Board of
Directors. That would result clearly in participation of the workforce.
PROF. CLARK: I would like to just say one quick thing.
Participation is not just involvement at a minimal level. Just the fact that
I work at a place does not mean I am fully participating. Because I am
not involved in the decision-making process, I am not fully human or a
full person in terms of the life of that corporation. We would not say
that slaves are participating in the colonial economy because they are
actually working in the fields. No, participation is much more than that.
We should remember - certainly there will be people in India that
benefit from this, but this is not being done to benefit Indians. If you
look at the statistics for 2002, $200 billion was the net transfer from the
poor countries to the rich countries. There has been $200 billion from
them to us. If you look at the 300-year history of the West dealing with
the third world countries, they have been subsidizing our growth and
development, our lifestyle, for the whole period, and this is just a
continuation.
The money made at this factory- certainly the wages will spread
throughout the economy in India, but the profits made, the surplus, are
not going to be reinvested into the long-term development of that area.
No, it is going to come back to the United States. This is what we find
in all the economies that rely wholly on or mostly on foreign investment
for their economic development.
PROF. NAUGHTON: We have two questions up there, so you can
give us those two. Please.
QUESTION: I appreciate this model, but typically in the last ten or
fifteen years that is not the model that U.S. corporations have been
working with. U.S. corporations have been engaging in contract
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suppliers and have no legal responsibility to workers, especially in
developing countries. Could you comment on those models rather than
maybe a subsidiary? Thank you.
PROF. NAUGHTON: One more question, behind you.
QUESTION: It occurs to me in listening to your discussion that
yesterday, as many of you may have heard and seen, on "Meet the
Press" Ralph Nader drew a rather harsh mirror image analogy between
the current Administration as well as corporate ideology, practice,
principle, or lack thereof. 14
I am wondering - this is just a little bit off the reservation - if
you could comment on, as we approach a very heated presidential
election where many people from a variety of ideologies, both on the
right, the left, and the middle, also echo the essence of what Nader is
suggesting, that the American governmental system, and keeping in
mind the separation of church and state, is now more advised or more
informed or more enlightened by the corporate corridor and corporate
considerations. This is evidenced by in-bound investment of human
resources and ex-bound investment ala Americana's style. Do you see
any increase in an advisory role for religion or basic fundamental
principles, such as secular principles of fair play and fair trade? Can
these principles advise, in a moral advisory way, American corporate
politics as well as corporate investment while not running afoul of the
political landscape in the larger legal context of the separation of church
and state.
PROF. NAUGHTON: Great questions. Can you be quick and
brief?
MR. GEOGHAN: With difficulty.
On the first question, not to make a pun out of it, but I think those
companies are getting religion. I think the companies that use service
contracts have taken to heart the pressure of the consumers and the
activist groups that have been working very hard - the Nike example.
I really am not close to this area, but it is my sense that they have
been going a very long way to try to meet basic human decency
standards in those operations. And I applaud the role of the activists in
making that happen. I think it has been almost entirely due to that role.
14. NBC News, Meet the Press, featuring Ralph Nader and Arnold
Schwarzenegger, Feb. 22, 2004 (National Broadcasting Co., Inc.).
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On the other front, for I guess ten years I was responsible for Union
Carbide's government relations, both federal and state, so I spent a fair
amount of time in Washington. I think the influence of industry in
Washington does not differ greatly from administration to
administration. I think some of the players change and there are some
offsetting pressures, if you will, from other sources in one administration
versus another. For example, to take sort of an adversary of the business
group, the American Association of Trial Lawyers is far more influential
in a Democratic administration than they are in a Republican
administration.
The church has to learn how to work in Washington. You know,
this is a tangent, but I am quite active in the Catholic Church, and the
fact that the Catholic Church does not have a political action committee
I think is just unbelievable. Why the Catholic Church with the faithful
in the United States is not taking a far more active role in trying to
influence government - and I recognize there are tax issues, but these
can all be managed - I just do not understand. The hierarchy speaks,
but there is no effort to get down to the faithful to create a Catholic vote,
and there should be a Catholic vote in the United States. So that is my
partisan explanation.
PROF. NAUGHTON: Thanks, Joe.
Talat? No, okay.
Charlie?
PROF. CLARK: I am going to shock everyone and agree with part
of the statement, and that is that the influence of industry remains high
regardless of who is in the White House. The players do change, but
basically the government is the shadow of big business. Big business is
the power. There are different extents and limits to that, but I would
agree with that.
PROF. NAUGHTON: Well, we are nearing the end of our time.
I wonder if I can just take a few moments to highlight several issues
which are pertinent to our conversation this morning.
When we think about religious values and their incorporation to
corporate social responsibility, what often religious values will want us
to do is to take us from where we are at and get us to the ideal. The
ideal is always the next step. So I would just like to make a couple of
points.
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One, how can religious values move us from a divided life to a life
of integration and unity? Most religious traditions will often speak
about this idea of a divided life - we call it hypocrisy. There is a
document from Vatican II that said that one of the greatest errors of our
age is the split between our professional lives and our religious values. 5
And so, as Joe I think was mentioning, we do have models, we do
have models in the corporate realm, but we also have some deep
problems that go along with it. Secularization is with us.
When we had our meeting, a teleconference to talk about this
session, Talat mentioned this idea of two hats, that often there is a sense
of "I feel like I am wearing two hats," which sometimes can lead to two
faces, which then can sometimes lead to two standards. Nathaniel
Hawthorne once said that no man can wear for any period one face to
himself and another to somebody else without finally getting bewildered
about which one is true.'
6
So we have this problem of the divided life and the tensions. But
we also have models of people who have done it right.
Second, moving from what we might call the dominance of
instrumental reasoning to a sense of virtue. Dr. Zamagni talked about the
idea that there is a sense of this crowding-out factor. When you are
sitting in a boardroom, there are great pressures. Those pressures can
crowd out other values. For example, if this is a publicly traded
company, if there are significant stock options available here, there is a
sense that those stock options can be used as a way of crowding out
other values.
We find this in all organizations. We in a sense can be very
instrumental. We can become somewhat laser-focused when we are in
the midst of pressure decisions. When one looks at a lot of the
controversies or the corruptions that occurred in something like Enron,
people were under great pressures to do something very technical, and
these other ideas, in a sense, got crowded out.
What we need is, of course, a tremendous sense that these people
are involved in not just simply technical kinds of projects; there are
really elements of virtue that need to be present.
Third, moving from a property relationship of disconnection to
15. Gaudium et spes 43.
16. See generally NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (Bantam
Classics 1965) (1850).
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connection. This is controversial. We talked about it briefly. The
property relationships you find in publicly traded companies are largely
associated with disconnected shareholders who have very little sense of
mission and its effects on the people who find themselves in these
communities.
What we have to do is thicken a very much more connected
relationship of property to the communities and people involved.
Fourth, we have run into the problem of pluralism. Here, how do
we live not from our boundaries but from our center? How do we draw
upon what is central to us in terms of our religious traditions instead of
reaching for a least-common denominator?
It is very interesting that all of these Board members have a
religious affiliation. Would we consider that part of the conversation, or
rather would we just simply reach for what is in a sense the least-
common denominator?
And fifth, moving from a sense of alienation to forgiveness. It
would be very interesting, for example, for the Board to sit there and
say, "What conditions led us to this situation that we may simply have to
move?" And would they ever take responsibility for it? And if they did,
what then would that lead to about how they would communicate to
their employees? Would they seek forgiveness, a very important
religious value?
It is very interesting. There is a firm up in Montreal, 7 and when
either a layoff or a firing occurs, the manager who performed the act
must request two face to face meetings with the people who were laid
off. One of the things the CEO, Robert Ouimet says is - he does all
the stuff - he gives proper notification, he will give all the benefits, he
will give training. But he says, "There is always alienation when those
people leave that plant." He says, "You cannot have reconciliation in
the midst of it. You can make it less, but you still have it." So in order
to have reconciliation, he and his management must seek out these
former employees and follow-up on a difficult and painful decision to be
17. For more details on this practice, see J. Robert Ouimet, Reconciliation of
Human Happiness and Business Profitability: It Can Be Done, Fourth Revised
Edition; see also http://www.our-project.org/en/home/home.htm (last visited Jan.
24, 2006).
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sure the employee is alright and to see if they need further help.
And lastly from a religious perspective is the role of prayer, a
contemplative outlook. There is a Protestant theologian by the name of
Stanley Hauerwas. He once said to a bunch of Catholics, "What do all
those masses do for you? What do all the Sabbaths do for you? What
do five times praying a day do for you? Does that spiritual outlook
cause you to see things that simply secular or technical ideas cannot do
for you?"18
So there is a lot for us to contemplate. I think our panelists have
done a great job of laying out some wonderful questions. But lunch is
awaiting us, so let's get to it. But please join me in warm thanks.
MS. UELMEN: Thank you to each of you for a fantastic discussion.
We have lunch out in the Atrium here and we will be back for the
next session at 1:30.
[Adjournment: 12:30 p.m.]
18. See generally STANLEY HAUERWAS, DISPATCHES FROM THE FRONT:
THEOLOGICAL ENGAGEMENTS WITH THE SECULAR (Duke Univ. Press 1995).
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Director of the Tri-State Coalition for Responsible Investment
Rabbi Mordechai Liebling
Director of The Shefa Fund
MS. UELMEN: Folks are still wandering in, but we can get started.
For our last and final session - we will have a discussion to try to
think thematically about some of the overarching questions of the day -
but we would like to focus also in this session on viable models.
We are very grateful for the help of the Interfaith Center on
Corporate Responsibility. Pat Daly just gave me a tremendous hand in
terms of assembling this panel. Unfortunately, Leslie Lowe had a death
in her family last night and so was not able to be with us.
Pat Daly is the Director of the Tri-State Coalition for Responsible
Investment. Rabbi Mordechai Liebling is the Director of The Shefa
Fund.
This will be a chance to explore another model for how religious
values can be incorporated into corporate decision-making with
shareholder resolutions.
MS. DALY: Good afternoon, all. Thanks.
I am hoping that it might be helpful to give a little bit of history and
current overview of the work of the members of the Interfaith Center on
Corporate Responsibility, otherwise known as the ICCR. Neither Rabbi
Liebling nor I are on that staff, but the ICCR community really is a large
membership organization, and we represent shareholders and faith-based
investors to that organization.
I would like to look at the history and also current activities of the
members of ICCR. Rabbi Liebling will be looking at some of the
premises of the approach of why we are doing this and the interplay
between faith and business. Then we are hoping that we might be able to
spend a good bit of time engaging in kind of a back and forth discussion.
As we look at investments - and we are institutional investors,
faith-based institutional investors working with public and other private
619
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investment firms - the members of ICCR really look at these
investments as an extension of our mission.
The ICCR was founded in 1971. Many of you may remember it
was the Episcopal Church that filed the first shareholder resolution
asking General Motors to leave South Africa.' That was the first of the
faith-based institutions to address a social issue with a corporation as a
shareholder.
This movement really came out of the 1960s, where up until that
time church groups and other faith-based institutions and individuals had
decided if they really did not like what the company was doing, or the
company's actions offended one's personal or spiritual values, then they
would divest of stock. Then church leaders realized that, as U.S.
investors, we were part of the company, owners of the company, and
that we needed to speak up and participate in the structure.
Today, we are more than 275 Jewish, Protestant, and Roman
Catholic institutions. Depending upon the stock market, we represent
approximately $1 10-to-$150 billion in investments.
We have been seen as the initiator and inspiration for the Social
Investment Movement. Today, well over 10 percent of portfolios -
trillions of dollars internationally - are invested with some kind of
ethical concerns, some kind of social criteria.
We have also helped to launch the Community Investment
Movement, the Alternative Investment Movement. Microcredit is one
form of that initiative.2
Today, in an attempt to focus our energy, our Working Groups
address the following concerns: access to health care, contract suppliers,
corporate governance issues, enabling access to credit, environmental
justice, global warming, promoting human rights, violence and
militarization of society, and water and food issues.
Very often, most people know us by our strategies of filing a
shareholder resolution.3 The most effective shareholder resolution is
I. Peace and Justice Ministries, Proxy Voting and the Mission of the Church (Jan.
2000), http://gc2003.episcopalchurch.org/documents/PROXY .PDF.
2. Microcredit is a process of lending by which small loans are extended to poor
people "for self-employment projects that generate income, allowing them to care for
themselves and their families." Grameen Bank, What is Microcredit, http://grameen-
info.org/mcredit/definit.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2006).
3. In addition to the strategies discussed, an accompanying slide listed related
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one that investors do not see, because investors and corporate
management have actually come together to work out some kind of
change within the company to address the concern.
In the past year, we also have an additional model. I was involved
in a decision by the Ford Motor Company where the shareholders
actually withdrew a resolution, but the company then decided to print
the resolution anyway, and together we made a statement that was
published in the proxy to inform the shareholders that concerns
regarding climate change were raised, and the various steps Ford was
taking.
You may have seen in Thursday's Wall Street Journal that AEP and
Cinergy have now agreed with the shareholders on a similar model and
are working on a report.4 We expect that companies internally studying
climate risk will be better positioned for long-term shareholder return,
and will be the technology drivers for energy efficient initiatives.
Hopefully, this will also bring about serious change in terms of their
greenhouse gas emissions. These companies will also include
information in the proxy using the same model that was developed with
Ford Motor Company.
Corporate dialogue is really the essence; this means sitting down
and working out the details of these concerns. That is really the core of
our work.
There have been, over the years, some consumer actions. Back in
the 1970s, you may remember the Nestle boycott. Companies that are
not based in the United States do not offer similar access to
shareholders, leaving consumer initiatives as critical strategies to
compliment shareholder initiatives.
Today, it is very rare that we sit down with a company alone. We
work with many organizations that bring technical assistance to the
dialogue. In many, many ways the corporations look at us as resources
that they cannot hire. We are investors. We want to make sure that the
company succeeds financially. At the same time, we also are looking
for credibility and integrity in a way that some other investors may not
be looking for.
legislative actions and collaboration with issue experts as other strategies.
4. Jeffrey Ball, AEP and Cinergy To Outline Ways To Cut Emissions, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 19, 2004, at A8.
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There are additional concerns with health care, both in the domestic
concerns regarding affordable access to pharmaceuticals and the
international access to HIV and AIDS drugs.5 We are seeing some
creative programs now, although we have needed to push very hard on
the address of HIV/AIDS. This is going to be a critical business issue
affecting the future of many of our corporations, certainly any company
that has any business operations or depends upon business in Africa.
Our contract suppliers program seeks to work with companies on
programs that ensure just wages and conditions in factories
internationally. You can go to ICCR.org for information on all of our
work. In particular, "Principles for Global Corporate Responsibility"
offers benchmarks for measuring business performance. This addresses
labor issues, environmental concerns, and corporate governance
concerns. What are the very specific elements that are needed for a
company to be successful financially and socially and ethically?
Corporate governance issues. 6 Let me give an overview -
institutional investors are investing in corporations for the long haul.
We are not day traders. In fact, some would argue that hitting the
numbers on a quarterly basis does not help create a healthy economy.
And so there are many ways of getting that overview into our dialogues.
With respect to enabling access to credit, we address capital flows
internationally and also domestically. Equal Credit Opportunity -
Community Reinvestment Act, Sub-prime Lending practices and
International Implementation of the Community Reinvestment Act are
some of the issues on the agenda before the financial institutions today.
We are just beginning our work on environmental justice.7
Actually we are looking to use our ability to open doors with some
companies on behalf of and with communities that are at risk.
Electrical utilities, insurance, manufacturing, oil & gas, and
transportation are the industries that are being addressed in terms of
5. An accompanying slide listed access & affordability, ethical patents,
nonpartisanship, payments & rebates, and price restraints as domestic concerns and
HIV/AIDS as an international concern.
6. An accompanying slide listed board inclusiveness, excessive/increased CEO
pay during layoffs, pay disparity, and annual elections of boards of directors as
corporate governance issues.
7. An accompanying slide stated that poor communities of color "carry a greater
burden of toxic contamination."
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climate change concerns.
Our concerns regarding human rights focus on Burma,
Chad/Cameroon, China, and Nigeria.
In our Violence and Militarization of Society work we address
weapons producers and concerns closer to home. Ethical criteria for
foreign military sales are critical; we have too many examples of where
the U.S. State Department had authorized sales to governments where,
after relationships have changed, those weapons are used against United
States citizens and others.
Water and food issues raise concerns that warrant a precautionary
principle. Genetically modified foods are new life forms that have not
been tested. There are no long-term feeding studies. We have no idea
what the long-term effects on the environment and health will be. New
life forms are not hybrids. Again, we are asking to consider the
precautionary principle. And then, obviously, the use and privatization
of water.
Other concerns continue. General Electric continues to resist the
remediation of the Hudson River and the removal of PCB contamination
and we continue to address the tobacco industry.
Here are some resources you may want to pursue.8
We will come back. Rabbi Liebling?
RABBI LIEBLING: Hi. I am here today as part of a member
organization of ICCR, the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility.
I would say that ICCR is probably one of the most successful interfaith
efforts in the United States. It is an organization that is over thirty years
old.
We have managed to breach any theological divides in order to
work together. I am going to talk about what I think are some of the
underlying principles that we share across faith traditions that enable us
to work together the way we do.
I think we would all agree that God is the source of all wealth and
creation, that all wealth, all of creation, emanates from God, is part of
God, and that all of us have a share in that wealth and in those resources.
And not only do all of us have a share, but all of us have the
responsibility to be good stewards of those resources, that one of the
8. A slide listed www.iccr.org, socialinvest.org, and www.foe.org as resources.
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primary responsibilities of all human beings is to be a steward of the
resources of the earth.
There is a Jewish Commentary on the Creation story: God is
showing Adam around the Garden of Eden and says to Adam, "See all
that I have created here. If you destroy it, it will not be fixed. It is your
responsibility to take care of it." That is the human responsibility, to
take care of creation and to be stewards of creation.
I think at ICCR - I was saying to Pat before that maybe we should
change the culture of poverty to the culture of sustainability, and we
would all have a better understanding of what that means, that we all are
committed to a culture of sustainability, and resources are a good thing,
not a bad thing inherently. It is how resources are used and disposed of
and shared which is really the human issue.
Probably what unites the various members of ICCR the most is a
passion for justice. Whether that justice is from the Book of Amos or
the Book of Matthew, it is a passion for justice. Justinian had a
definition of justice which I think fits all of us: "Justice is the firm and
continuous desire to render to everyone that which is his due." 9
Justice is not a principle as much as it is a passion. Justice is a way
one tries to lead one's life, and it is a passion for creating justice in the
world. In the Book of Deuteronomy, it says: "Justice, justice, you shall
pursue."10  That is one of the primary commandments that all of the
faiths share. In the Book of Isaiah, I believe it says, "God will be
exalted through acts of justice [sic],"" So it is our passion for justice
that unites all of us in working with the corporate world.
There is a little Hasidic story that helps me understand what we do.
There was a man who owned a factory, who had his rebbi, his teacher,
whom he studied with faithfully and followed. Finally, this man
realized he had enough money that he could sell his factory, retire, and
study Torah all day long. He came to his rebbi and said, "Rebbi, I am
going to sell my factory and retire so I can study Torah all day long. My
factory will close." The rebbi said, "You can't do that. You have fifty
people who work for you. The Torah that you bring to the world is to
9. The Quotations Home Page, http://www.theotherpages.org/topic-j2.html (last
visited Jan. 24, 2006).
10. Deuteronomy 16:20.
11. Isaiah 5:16 ("And the LoRD of Hosts is exalted by judgment, the Holy God
proved holy by retribution.")
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give people jobs. You can study with me, but you can't sell your
factory."
So the creation of wealth in the world through justice and through a
fair means is something that we can share across faith traditions and
realize that there are principles that we can bring into the world of
business.
The people at ICCR think of ourselves more as owners rather than
as investors. When we own stocks in a corporation, the reality of the
modem American stock market is that our money is not going to Ford
Motor Company to expand its factories when we buy shares in Ford.
Our buying a share in Ford Motor Company has the same relation to
Ford as our buying a used Ford from a car dealer down the street. It has
no relationship whatsoever to capitalizing Ford Motor Company. So we
are not investing in a company in that sense.
But we are owners of that company, and in Jewish law, at least, we
have the responsibility as owners of any enterprise to make sure that
something we own does no harm. 12 We always have the responsibility
that our assets can never harm anybody else. So if we are owners of
large corporations, we have a responsibility to do whatever is in our
power to make sure that those assets don't hurt anybody else.
Now, I will not go through the details of Jewish law, but clearly
when many observant Jews own shares in companies that are open on
Saturday - that would be against Jewish law and making money - the
Rabbinic ruling at that point was: because you own such an
infinitesimally small part of the company and you cannot affect
company policy, it was fine to do that. That is the essence of it, without
going into the details.
But the difference today around issues that we are talking about
now is, as Pat showed you, institutional investors own a huge amount of
the capital of the United States. Ten percent of the capital that is
institutionally invested is already invested with socially responsible
criteria. Over 50 percent of all the equities in the United States are
institutionally owned. That is a huge amount. So institutional owners,
in fact, do have power to change corporate policy.
The major change in the world of shareholder activism in the last
12. Leviticus 25:15 (prohibiting any wrong in buying or selling).
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two or three years has been the entrance of pension funds, particularly
union funds, but also the biggest player is California State Pension
Funds. The State of Connecticut now has a very progressive policy on
pension funds. So pension funds, along with the funds of religious
institutions, can now in fact affect corporate policy in a very serious
way. The landscape in the last several years has dramatically changed in
terms of the ability of share owners to affect corporate policy.
That has been additionally bolstered by the SEC's ruling six months
ago that mutual funds and money managers are now going to have to
disclose how they vote their proxies.13 So automatically voting with
management might not happen as much as before.
Religious institutions have the ability and responsibility to bring
moral desiderata into the world. Of all the issues that Pat put out before
us, we will take the idea of justice and say, "What is justice?" We will
take the idea of stewardship, which is the basic principle governing
having a healthy environment and say, "What is this going to contribute
to a healthy environment?"
In the Book of Deuteronomy, it says, "You shall love God with all
your heart, with all your soul, and with all your might."' 14 It is part of the
central Jewish prayer of the day, and I know that that line from
Deuteronomy also appears in many Christian prayers as well.
If you look at the Hebrew word for "love God with all your might,"
that word actually means strength. In fact, the way the rabbis used it, it
means economic strength. So a careful analysis of m'odekha (your
strength) actually means with all of your wealth, you should love God
with all of your wealth. 5
A part of that is, of course, giving money for justice. But a part of
loving God with all of your wealth is the wealth that we keep, our assets,
in this case shares in our corporations. How do we love God with our
assets? We love God with our assets by trying to do justice with them,
by taking responsibility for the assets that we have, and saying: "Okay,
what is the most responsible thing for me to do as an owner in this
13. Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications
Between Security Holders and Boards of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
48301, 17 C.F.R. 240 (Aug. 8, 2003).
14. Deuteronomy 6:5.
15. Parashat Va'ethanan Part II on the Shem'a Yisrael Passage,
http://www.judaic.org/bible/vaethanan2.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
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corporation, and how can I get this corporation to change its policies to
be more responsible? And, given the fact that institutional investors do
have some clout, then I really do have the moral responsibility to go
ahead and do that, because it is a doable task, in fact I have the ability to
change policy."
In conclusion, I think that the various faith groups of ICCR take the
belief and commandment to "love your neighbor as you love yourself'
to say that we have to exercise our responsibility as owners of assets, as
owners of capital in this society, to make sure that justice is done with
all of the assets that we have.
Pat, do you want to say something more?
MS. DALY: Over the years, I know I have been doing this work
long enough to tell you stories of being booed by 3,000 people and
people screaming at me, "I do not care about those people in South
Africa" - actually not as nicely as I just said that - again, pretty awful
times whbre people did not have the skills or the ability to be able to put
these concerns together with the idea of profitability.
Over the years, I believe - we are certainly not the ones
responsible for this - over the years the business community has
realized that attention to workers, attention to the environment, attention
to the communities within which we work, attention to product safety-
we can go on down the line - is actually quite key to profitability.
Obviously, if you ignore all of those things, you are going to be in
trouble at one point.
So over the years our support has increased. Initially, we were
thrilled to get 3 percent of the vote because that meant that we were able
to go back the next year. According to the Securities and Exchange
Commission's Guidelines, shareholders need 3 percent of the vote for
the first year that you file a shareholder resolution, you need 6 percent
the second year, and 10 percent the third year.
Now, while some of our concerns still are in the 3-to-6 percent area,
we are also getting 40-some-odd percent of the vote, even for
environmental concerns. That is pretty significant. I think we have been
able to prove that some of these issues are clearly financial issues.
The other piece that I would just like to reflect on here is the
number of teams of people within corporations that I have been really
honored to work with, people who are working in the trenches and really
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bringing about some very, very serious change that I know not only is it
evident today but will be in the future. The goal here is to eventually
run this company on principles of sustainability. There are certain steps
we need to take in the next couple of years in order to see the changes
that will need to be in place ten and fifteen years from now. It is really
an honor to work with many of those people who are out there today.
I cannot say that exists in all the companies right now, but it is
certainly the model that I think is getting out there, whether they are
working with ICCR members or other partners who are concerned about
these issues.
RABBI LIEBLING: I want to add one thing to Pat before we throw
it open to questions.
I think that, as Pat said earlier, corporate dialogue is probably the
way we are most effective in bringing about change. Face-to-face
meetings with other human beings change things, and I think that many
times the people on the corporate side are very appreciative that ICCR
has brought these concerns up because it allows them many times to
make the changes that they do really want to make.
We have to remember that there are human beings who populate the
corporate world making these decisions, and many of them make
decisions because of what they perceive as the bottom line, and they are
frequently open and grateful if somebody can show them that acting in
an ethical way will improve the bottom line. And it gives them the
arguments to bring further up the chain of how to change company
policy for reasons that are both financial and ethical.
MS. DALY: I have even had a CEO say to me, "I really welcome
this shareholder resolution because this is going to give me support
within the company for doing the things that we need to do here."
Should we have some conversation around this?
QUESTION: Rabbi Liebling, you mentioned microcredit. Are you
also interested in microfinance? As far as microcredit is concerned,
which type of model? Are you affiliated with [inaudible] bank type?
Second, are you also - not imposing, but suggesting - to your
companies standards, such as SA-8000?
And, Rabbi Liebling, you mentioned that justice is the basic value
which guides your decision. But the question, which is a bit subtle, I
realize, could be the following. As we know, the concept of justice is
clear to everybody. But as you know, there are many different theories
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of justice. For instance, one could be utilitarian and could interpret
justice along utilitarian lines. Another one could follow neo-
contractualism by John Rawls, and then you would interpret justice in
practice in a particular way, according to the leximen criterion, etc. Or
you can have the other theory of justice according to the so-called
theories of rights, such as Ronald Dworkin, a famous philosopher,
lawyer, etc.
Now, in these cases, when you come to practical actual decisions,
when you have to choose between different alternatives, and these
alternatives have different meanings in terms of different theories of
justice, how do you solve this problem among yourselves? That would
be very interesting to me.
RABBI LIEBLING: It sure would be.
MS. DALY: Back in the 1970s, as we reflected on our work
together, we realized that we were in primarily an adversarial role and
we were critiques of corporations. We wanted to also put our money
where our mouths were and also invest in some of the other models.
So over the years, our institutions have put aside money and have
tried to look at our whole portfolio and identify the percentages that
would go into whether it would be alternative investing, community-
developing investing, and so there are a variety of models.
Our Tri-State Coalition for Responsible Investment founded the
Leviticus Fund, which is based here in New York, and finances small
projects, businesses, with the theme in the last ten years of day care and
housing here in the northeast. Obviously, there are other models
internationally.
For the most part, unless you are working with a huge pension fund
- my Sisters, we have a few million dollars, the Dominican Sisters of
Caldwell. The United Methodists are probably working - what did
they have, $12 billion?
RABBI LIEBLING: Yes.
MS. DALY: We come with really different portfolios. They would
have the ability to vet a number of projects that our own Sisters would
not, so we would typically use an intermediary.
Your second question, when we are working on some standards, we
do have these global principles. There is also the GRI model that is out
there and others that you had mentioned, some environmental standards.
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It just means like a 100-page survey sometimes.
The key for us would be third-party verification. We can come to
an agreement on what is the appropriate model or the appropriate
vehicle to really evaluate the behavior and the standards within the
company.
RABBI LIEBLING: All I can say is thank God we do not have to
have academic debates about justice in our work. The truth is we have
not had discussions like that. For the most part, ICCR works as a
federation rather than a univocal organization.
Any member institution is free to put forth a resolution and then
invite other institutions to be co-filers with them on their resolution. If
the resolution falls within the general framework of ICCR, then ICCR
will devote staff time to it to help support the resolution.
But sometimes a member will propose a resolution that nobody else
particularly agrees with. They have the right to propose that resolution.
ICCR as an entity will not devote staff time to it, but they are free to
propose that.
So our federated system gives us the luxury of not having to work
out the fine details of what theory of justice we are operating under.
MS. DALY: We work on the issues we can work on in communion.
That is what we do.
QUESTION: Pat, I am familiar with most of the issues that you are
involved in, but I am not familiar with the HIV/AIDS advocacy. Would
you elaborate a little bit on that and what you are asking the companies
to do and what position you are taking?
RABBI LIEBLING: I will start and then Pat can go.
The majority of the HIV shareholder resolutions that are being
proposed this year are being proposed to companies like Coke, Pepsi,
Caterpillar, that have large work forces in southern Africa.
One of the difficulties of the HIV/AIDS pandemic is that culturally
people do not want to get tested, testing is considered a taboo. If the
employer would institute testing, that would remove the cultural taboo in
many cases and would go a long way towards beginning preventive
strategies. If the employers would begin to take measures educating
their work forces about HIV/AIDS, it would also go a long way towards
changing things.
So these shareholder resolutions are all transparency resolutions,
meaning they are asking the company, "What are you doing with your
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work force relative to the HIV/AIDS issue? Please prepare a report in
six months or a year to let us know what steps you are taking to ensure
that our company will have a healthy and available work force in the
future." That is the bulk of the HIV/AIDS resolutions this year.
MS. DALY: We started a couple of years ago primarily working
with the pharmaceutical companies on getting access, availability of
drugs into Africa. Obviously, these are serious cultural issues. The
issue of confidentiality is critical in these programs. The dependents -
you know, "family" is a relative term in many cases. The question
would be in some communities you would need to make sure that a
number of wives are covered by insurance and have availability. There
are all kinds of intricacies in our dialogue.
I would say that in every company that has received a resolution,
there is an active dialogue going on regarding this right now. Some
problems in terms of really having companies get their heads around
this. Others have taken this on and really want to be in the forefront of
how U.S. corporations are responding to this pandemic.
QUESTIONER: I ask it really too because our company had at one
point huge operations in southern Africa with, if memory serves me,
about 40 percent HIV-positive and 20 percent full-blown AIDS. It was
a terrible, terrible problem to deal with.
MS. DALY: The understanding is that this will have long-term
effects on the business of the company, in terms of whether it is a
product availability - I mean, this is really shifting the whole economic
arena throughout the continent.
QUESTION: I think we would all like to believe that, as you say,
ethical business practices enhance the bottom line. In business ethics,
people use the phrase "doing well by doing good." I suspect, in the
majority of cases, it is in fact true that ethical practices enhance the
bottom line. But I was wondering if you have encountered situations in
which the right thing to do would actually be something that is
counterproductive to the bottom line of the corporation, and what
happens if you encounter that situation?
I suppose as investors that is something you never deal with
because you would not be investing in a company for which that is true.
But I was wondering if you ever faced a situation in which it is actually
not in someone's self-interest to do the right thing, which is really when
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ethics has some bite, right? If it is in your interest to do good, then that
is easy, you should do good because it will benefit you. But ethics
becomes really hard when it is not in your self-interest to do the right
thing.
MS. DALY: Do you know a situation?
QUESTIONER: No. You are much more involved in this on the
ground level than I am. I am curious if you see this.
MS. DALY: The comment I made before about the long-term
health of economic viability, not only for the company but for economic
systems, obviously needs to bring us beyond hitting the numbers for this
quarter.
I will give you an example. I have been working for many years
with the issue of cleaning up the Hudson River and General Electric's
responsibility there. One might offer that certainly this company would
have to continue to fight this because it is going to cost them a good
chunk of money. We are asking right now as shareholders to tell us how
much it has already cost in trying to delay the cleanup. When you have
spent thirty years trying to get out of a liability, obviously that is an
issue.
I know at one meeting around the design of the cleanup there were
twenty-seven employees, mostly attorneys, at that meeting just a few
weeks ago. I mean, this is a serious economic hit. One would say in the
long-term interest of the company, "You know, this is what you have
been asked to do. Do it, even if it is going to be a hit in this quarter or in
this year." And certainly when you are talking about one of the largest
capitalized companies in the world, you are talking about profits for
about a week and a half.
RABBI LIEBLING: I was not part of these negotiations, but an
example that comes to mind is a year or two ago, Citibank bought a sub-
prime lender. A sub-prime lender is somebody who lends money to
people at outrageous rates. Shareholders of Citibank met with Citibank.
And clearly it would affect Citibank's bottom line; they would make less
money if they were not involved in sub-prime lending.
And, after a series of dialogues, Citibank agreed to a set of
guidelines that would seriously reduce the amount of sub-prime lending
that this company did. They did it for reputational reasons and for
ethical reasons, but it was a hit to the bottom line.
MS. DALY: While you are moving the microphone around the
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room, I will just give you this other resource too. This is our new proxy
resolutions book. It is the publication. We have 199 shareholder
resolutions before seventy-six companies this year. Again, it is available
at iccr.org.
QUESTION: How do you work with companies from the point of
view of investing? Let's say you have a biotech company, it is public,
but it is rather young, let's say it is a few years old, and they are doing
work in gene therapy, gene splicing, that sort of thing. The bulk of their
laboratories are involved in various areas, but they have one small
laboratory that is looking at genetically modified foods. Would you fail
to recommend that company to be invested in?
MS. DALY: I would say our members have social screens, so each
of our members - at this point, I do not know of any of our members
with a screen that would set aside biotech, although that is a discussion
right now.
RABBI LIEBLING: Let me clarify something. ICCR does not
make investment recommendations to its members. Every institution
develops its own screens. There is no common screen. There are 275
institutions. There are probably 275 different screens. Every institution,
as I said, is autonomous, develops its own screens, will decide what to
invest in and what not.
Some institutions are very careful about where they put their
money. Some institutions say, "I do not believe in socially responsible
investing screens. Shareholder activism is what is important. That is
what really makes changes and screened investment does not make
changes."
ICCR as an institution takes no position on that. All we do is work
with institutions that want to be involved in shareholder activism.
MS. DALY: Thank you, Rabbi Liebling. I was going down a very
complicated road. You simplified it.
QUESTIONER: Can I ask another question? What about the
transparency of the institutions? In other words, are you making
pressure for reducing the isometric information between citizen
institutions? I think transparency is a big issue in your field of activity.
RABBI LIEBLING: Absolutely, that is right.
MS. DALY: Certainly since Enron had such an effect on the
climate of investments in the United States and internationally, I believe
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that more and more shareholders, institutional and personal
shareholders, see the very critical need for disclosure and transparency
from companies, as well as the fact that the accountability of boards of
directors is not a token accountability, that they clearly need to be
representing shareholders and not be the buddies of executives.
RABBI LIEBLING: Let me give you a brief history, if I may. Up
until really the last couple of years, there were two fairly separate
strands of the shareholder activist movement in the United States. There
was ICCR, which really represented the social justice wing of the
shareholder activist movement, and then a much larger movement was
focused on corporate governance. So let's say in a typical year ICCR
members would put forth 150 or 200 resolutions; the corporate
governance world might be putting forth 400 or 500 resolutions.
Since Enron, etc., those two movements are now working in much
more cooperation and coalition with each other. It is the corporate
governance wing of shareholder activism that has been much more
focused on transparency, election of boards of directors, CEO pay, all of
those very important governance issues.
ICCR is now doing more of that and there is a lot more cross-
fertilization between those two branches of shareholder activism to
focus more on transparency issues, because I would say that we have
learned how important transparency issues are and issues of CEO pay
and boards of directors are to impact the justice issues.
MS. UELMEN: Thank you so much for this wonderful discussion.
We will move immediately - we thought to spend just the last
half-hour with a little bit of time for a kind of more thematic discussion
of the overarching themes and to continue the back-and-forth and
putting forward ideas which have emerged throughout the day.
To facilitate that discussion we have Professor Bob Hurley, who is
from Fordham's Graduate School of Business Administration. I will





PROF. HURLEY:' A very stimulating day, wouldn't you say?
I was taking notes. One of the most exciting things about being in
the academy is the stimulation of ideas, and we certainly heard a lot of
that today. I am going to just go through a few highlights and then
throw it out to the group for discussion.
We learned from Dean Sargent that individual moral priorities are
disappearing, leading to moral indifference. We learned about the
power of bureaucracy, and the compelling need to conform and be
accepted can be a danger. We also learned about pressure, ambition,
and unguided pragmatism.2
We learned from Brad Wendel that Christianity is a radical and
subversive enterprise - and I would add, only if practiced well. We
also learned that perhaps the question is that we need to learn how to
craft non-religious, widely shared reasons for coercive control of
behavior.'
We learned from Steve Resnicoff that there is really only one
conscience, not two; not the individual and the corporate - but that
there is only one - which requires courage.4
We learned from Professor Zamagni that there is a micro view of
this whole thing and that companies appear to want to be more socially
1. Robert Hurley is a Professor of Management Systems at the Fordham
University Graduate School of Business Management. Additionally, Professor Hurley
is a widely published authority in the business and marketing fields.
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responsible about the demise of Taylorism, about the rise of the
knowledge worker, and the need to use human reciprocity to motivate
and to lead to cooperative ventures. We have also learned in that session
that religious values can actually be compatible with corporate success,
and about the importance of fraternity.5
We learned from Joe Geoghan, Michael Naughton, Talat Ansari
and Charles Clark that corporations do have integrity.6 We learned that
happiness requires participation and we need to move from division to
integration.7
We learned from Amy Uelmen and Professor Bruni that there is an
Economy of Communion and that public happiness requires fraternity,
again compatibility between religious values and economic success.8
We also learned that entrepreneurship, which is central to wealth and
enterprise, is a person on a mission, a person with passion, which goes
again back to the individual, and what probably Keynes would describe
as the animal instincts of creation.9
We learned from Pat Daly and Rabbi Liebling the incredible power
of like-minded individuals and that we are owners, not investors.10
In summarizing those interesting and compelling ideas, let me
throw out to the audience the following question: What were the most
compelling insights for you from the day?
PARTICIPANT: I think that whenever I want to really understand
modern society, I try to find someone from the third or fourth century.
One of the greatest critics of wealth, the creation and accumulation and
all that goes with it, was St. John of Antioch's Christendom. He was not
in favor of massive or forced redistribution. He said it was important to
change the minds and the hearts of those who had accumulated wealth,
5. Zamagni, supra Keynote Address: Religious Values and Corporate Decision
Making: An Economist's Perspective.
6. Ansari, Clarke, Geoghan, Naughton, supra Panel Two: Managing As If Faith
Matters.
7. Id.
8. Amy Uelmen and Luigino Bruni, infra Religious Values and Corporate
Decision Making: The Economy of Communion Project.
9. John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) was a prolific writer and key figure in the
field of economics. Keynes viewed the economy as a contest between the "hoarding"
instinct (instinct to save and look for conservative investments) and the entrepreneurial
instinct or "animal spirits."
10. Daly, Rabbi Liebling, supra Panel Three: Viable Models: Shareholder
Resolutions.
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which he argued either was through fraud on their part or their parents'
or grandparents'. Somewhere along the line he always thought that it
was based on an injustice - and in his society it was probably more true
than not true that that would be the case - but that it is important to
change the minds and the hearts of those who have this power.
I think one of the themes of this whole discussion, especially the
last panel and what they do, is trying to change the minds and the hearts
and to treat the people who work in the corporations as much as persons
as the poor people that we frequently advocate for.
When John Paul talks about the preferential options for the poor
and others, a lot of rich people said, "This is great."" But what he really
meant is that we are all equally persons and we all have to have the same
dignity, and we do not want to exclude anyone.
I think that this approach is very much in tune with what the
tradition for 2,000 years has been saying, and I was very encouraged.
PROF. HURLEY: Other insights, comments, from the themes?
Let me ask a slightly different question. What are the implications
for action or where we go forward in terms of religion and corporate
decision-making, corporate life and religious life? Any thoughts about
where we ought to go in the future of where this is headed?
PARTICIPANT: I think the implications for looking at what the
ethical language is for Muslims, Christians, Jews, Buddhists, Hindus are
profound. This is especially true given the globalization realities that we
are dealing with, and the fact that money is something that passes
through everybody's hands.
PROF. HURLEY: A common currency.
PARTICIPANT: So it does come down to the common language of
economics. Economics does not articulate ethical principles as clearly as
religious language, and so ecumenical dialogue becomes a very
important commodity. It is important in order to start to realize the
importance of defining justice, of defining right relationship among
peoples and right relationship among a creator, whatever that might
mean in particular. And so it really does have global implications,
financial implications, and I think human implications.
PROF. HURLEY: Interesting.
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As you were saying that, I was thinking of a religious economist
and where he or she might publish. There probably are not too many
disciplines where we combine the two, and perhaps that is part of our
problem in developing the lexicon.
PARTICIPANT: When I first took a business ethics course, about
twenty five years ago at Teachers College,'I was the only person who
could talk to the professors in any language outside of utilitarianism.12
When I was bringing up questions to the business people outside of
utilitarianism, they thought I was crazy and radical.
PROF. HURLEY: Which was true, right?
PARTICIPANT: I do not think that has changed. I think it has
grown even more critical, and that is truly unfortunate. Ethics is no
longer ethics, it is now PR. When ethics becomes public relations and
marketing tools, then everybody is diminished tremendously in terms of
the quality of life.
PROF. HURLEY: Interesting. Yes?
PARTICIPANT: In terms of the issue of religious values in the
corporation, my sense is that there is a consensus at the end of the day
that there is a role for religious values in decision-making in a
corporation, but there is not a consensus on where those values should
be placed and how they should be employed.
I think there are two distinct avenues: one being the inculcation into
the corporate entity itself of some kind of religious orientation or value
system or faith tradition; the second is further strengthening the ability
of the people who run the corporation and the people in the mid-
management of the corporation to use their own faith value systems to
accomplish potentially the same goal, but not be the corporate entity
itself. The distinction is an important one, because I think basically the
corporation is a civil body, it is like a state in a sense. It is secular in
nature.
I think that by way of further action there needs to be continued
dialogue within the academic community as to how to bridge that
apparent difference between trying to further inculcate religious values
into the corporate entity, as opposed to strengthening the ability of the
managers to bring their own religious value system to decision-making.
12. Utilitarianism holds that actions are good in proportion to the amount of
happiness produced and number of people happiness is produced in. See JOHN
STEWART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1861).
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PROF. HURLEY: Interesting. That requires leaders shaping
cultures to allow those kinds of conversations to happen, and that is a
difficult process.
PARTICIPANT: I would just like to say that as someone who has
neither studied economics nor law, something that Professor Bruni said I
think holds true for the whole event today, that it comes from life. 3
There are a lot of things we talked about today. We find trouble
with the language of trying to transpose ideas from religion to
economics, or back and forth, or just getting ideas even between
different religions or between different people. The strongest tool we
have is the life, and that is similar to words like fraternity and
reciprocity, even though we may have different ideas of what they are, if
we live them together, then we will get to those answers. That is why
dialogue is such an important thing.
It does not mean that we need to know the answers right now. The
theory and the talking about it can help. If we go back to our
corporations, go back to our academic institutions, and we try to live
with the values and try to experiment with the values and try to treat
people properly, then I think little changes happen. I think individuals do
make ripples, and this can be an example of it.
PROF. HURLEY: That is a great example.
If you look at the literature on organizational learning and
organizational change, what essentially happens is individuals have
dialogue with other individuals, which come to groups and groups have
dialogues, and then it sort of bubbles up, and it can affect institutional
change. So I think dialogue is absolutely right.
Pat?
MS. DALY: To your point of what is next, later this year there will
be an initiative that will be announced, kind of a pilot program, which
initially came from ARC, the Alliance of Religions and Conservation. It
is a group that has its headquarters in Manchester, England. 14 In the past
- I guess it was sometime in October - the World Bank actually
published their book on "Faith and Conservation."
Now, the people who have been involved in ARC are launching
what is referred to as the IIIG, the International Interfaith Investment
13. Uelmen & Bruni, supra note 8.
14. For more information on the Alliance of Religions and Conservation, visit ARC
http://www.arcworld.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
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Group, gathering the ten major faiths of the planet. 5 Part of it will be
picked up using ICCR as a bit of the model, but it will be not just a
resource but also it will be an investment arm. This resource will
hopefully, over the years, impact on a local level as well as an
international level when one has major money invested and pooled from
all of the faith traditions. So watch for that.
PROF. HURLEY: You heard it here - breaking news.
Other thoughts, comments?
PROF. ZAMAGNI: Thank you. Two remarks.
The first one - and perhaps that was the answer to your first
question - what I most liked today in this laboratory experiment is the
trans-disciplinary approach. That is something that we academics are
missing particularly in this time. Usually we talk only among our, let's
say, clones. Our seminars are made of people not only economists,
because economics is too late, and discuss micro or macro economics
for international trade, but within that we discuss only with those
colleagues who are working exactly on the same thing.
That is a major problem, because universities were not created right
from the beginning for that purpose. The word itself, university, means
convergence towards the unity of knowledge. To converge towards the
unity of knowledge we need to be trans-disciplinary.
So the idea of putting together a professor of law, a professor of
economics, non-professors but people who can teach and can explain
part of their experience, I found it very important, very interesting. So I
hope that Fordham University might continue this.
On the other hand, to answer your second question about action,
now there is a risk these days as I perceive it, in this time, as far as the
corporate social responsibility discourse is going on. The risk is the
following.
As perhaps some of you know, we belong to the old continent. The
European Union has started two years ago publishing the Green Book on
Corporate Social Responsibility. 16 We know that it is going to take
some measures at the level of the European Union, which includes
twenty-five countries.' 7 In a couple of months, as we know, the
15. For more information on the International Interfaith Investment Group, visit
3iG, http://www.3ignet.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
16. For more information on the European Union's green papers, visit EUROPA,
http://www.europa.eu.int (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
17. For more information on the member and candidate states of the European
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European Union will give guidelines to the various corporations
working within the European Union."
So what is the risk? The risk is that corporate social responsibility
might become a new terrain, a new field, a new battle. In the past, the
battle was on commodities. Commercial trade meant that the country or
those countries who were better equipped and were more efficient, could
gain ground.
Now the risk is that this type of battle is transferred from the
commodity or service field into corporate social responsibility, which
means ethics. So perhaps something should be done coming from
experiences of this type, etc., because that would be in my opinion a
disaster, namely because that would mean that ethics would be
transformed into a new type of implicit competition.
As far as I know, in this part of the world, North America, the
United States and Canada, they are not following the same track as the
European Union as far as that goes. So suppose that next year the
European Union fixes the guidelines of corporate social responsibility,
and here in this part of the world, or in China and Japan, nothing. What
is going to happen to international trade? I mean, these are really very
serious problems.
Perhaps - who knows? Fordham University might propose
something. Amy could.
PROF. HURLEY: Amy will solve that.
PROF. BRUNI: Thank you. I would just add something to what
Professor Zamagni said.
My first impression of this day was we are coming from a country
where now the picture that comes of the USA is not the picture that we
discovered today here. The idea of corporate responsibility, that for me
was a very, very big discovery, to know that there are people looking for
something new, even in Manhattan, in New York, in Fordham.
At this particular moment of time, in Europe the picture that we
have is very different. That for me was personal - I knew, but it
touched directly.
Secondly, as a proposal, I think as people interested in keeping
Union, visit EUROPA, http://europa.eu.int/abc/govemments/index_en.htm (last visited
Mar. 1, 2006).
18. For more information on the area of Corporate Social Responsibility in the
European Union, visit CSR, http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/employmentsocial/soc-
dial/csr/index.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
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religious values within economics, economic life, I think in my opinion
one peculiar characteristic of people who have the gift of faith is the
value of intrinsic motivational action. Today the great debate is: how is
it possible to have non-instrumental motivation, because everything can
be represented as a sort of need for an individual?
I think religious people are people who can create and can be a sort
of spring of intrinsic motivation even in business, in market interaction.
I think this is a great service to humankind because everybody needs
intrinsic motivation, and also because it is very difficult to create
exogenously in market interaction. I think this is an important role of
the religious values.
PROF. HURLEY: It is interesting. My area of research is in
leadership, and in leadership a hot topic these days is emotional
intelligence in leadership. Emotional intelligence really gets at the
question of how do you inspire people, and empathy, and how do you
get below the surface, which is also connected to this idea of humanity
and community. And so it can be tied together in terms of leadership.
That gets right at the heart of intrinsic motivation. How do you
connect people's interests? One of the best definitions of leadership I
have come across was by Robert Hogan, who is a psychologist. He said
that what good leaders really do is they get people to temporarily
suspend their individual interests for the common good, which is
someone giving something up for some reason, such as fraternity,
community, or something larger than oneself. 9 This is inspiring.
So perhaps a way out of this problem is leadership, and more of it,
and maybe perhaps different kinds of leadership.
MS. UELMEN: And perhaps they might ultimately discover that it
is in their individual interest to then enter into that dimension.
I would just like to add if you have any looming questions or a
sense of what are the open areas to explore, I personally am all ears,
because this is a conversation that we would like to continue, perhaps in
a workshop forum. We are open to ideas or suggestions for the format
as well.
For those who have CLE, there was an evaluation sheet. But even
if you did not get Continuing Legal Education, if you would like, you
may jot down a few notes on the evaluation and your ideas and thoughts
19. See generally Robert Hogan, Gordon Curphy & Joyce Hogan, What We Know
About Leadership, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST, June 1994.
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for how to continue this conversation.
Again, thank you so much to all of you who have helped to make
this day a success. We will end with a very simple reception out in the
Atrium, cheese and crackers, basically as a way to continue the
conversation. Thank you again to all of you for coming and all who
have contributed today.
[Adjournment: 4:00 p.m.]
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